Pleasure is the Means by Which Goodness Should be Judged
The central theme of the works of Epicurus from which all specifics of philosophic reasoning radiates is the type and intensity of pleasure any act produces. Essentially, this philosophy is a denial of the conventional mode of thought which endows certain pleasing acts with morality and others with a lack of morality. Since no pleasure is thus inherently bad, the determination of whether to pursue it or not should be based on aspects to which a moral condition can be applied. For instance, pursuing a pleasure providing long term gratification of natural desires considered necessary to the human condition would be a choice of greater morality than pursuing a pleasure providing only briefly enjoy instant gratification that meets no immediately apparent necessity. This pursuit of pleasure has been misapprehended and misunderstood over time about as much to the same degree as Nietzsche’s Uberman. Epicureanism has become synonymous with hedonism and is often viewed as a philosophy that simply puts the pursuit of pleasure outside any moral or ethical context. If that were so, Epicurus would not have outlined in detail such differentiations as illusory desires as opposed to natural desires nor would he have both advised and practiced the secondary component of his conceptualization of pleasure as the arbiter of goodness.
Moderation is the Unalterable Condition for Enjoying a Good Life
The application of this condition is an outright rejection of the basis for the misapprehended concept of Epicureanism. The pursuit of pleasure solely as an end itself which forms the underlying basis of the widely misinterpreted philosophy would by definition place no limitations upon enjoyment. Since a good life is the end while the pursuit of pleasure is merely the means, moderation becomes not just an essential matter for consideration, but a fundamental governing principle which must always be rationally applied. This, of course, becomes an irreconcilable delimiter to the introduction of hedonism into the life of one following the directive of Epicurus.
Pleasure is the Absence of Pain
Another problem at the heart of misreading Epicurus is confusing conventional interpretations of pleasure with the definitions Epicurus describes in his text. Pleasure is typically associated with positive attribution as providing an indulgence of the senses. Pleasure as Epicurus has formulated things becomes a negative attribution: pleasure is not the presence of good feeling, but the absence of bad ones. The states of pleasure sought by the Epicureans was not production of happiness or sensuality, but more akin to a narcotic state of mind which was is no longer troubled by unnecessary concerns. The pursuit of this kind of pleasure could be achieved by simplifying one’s diet, for instance, so that anxiety is no longer produced by eating something which provides immediate gratification with taste, but at the expense of longer-lasting health-related consequences. Another means of pursuing pleasure of tranquility—and one that Epicurus goes to great lengths to recommend—is to commit to a lack of community involvement. For Epicurus, becoming a political or social activist is one of the surest routes to making sure you don’t enjoy the best possible life you could.
