Part I: Of God
The first part of the book addresses the relationship between God and the universe. Spinoza was engaging with a tradition that held that God exists outside of the universe, that God created the universe for a reason, and that God could have created a different universe according to his will. Spinoza denies each point. According to Spinoza, God is the natural world. Spinoza concludes that God is the substance comprising the universe; that God exists in itself, not outside of the universe; and that the universe exists as it does from necessity, not because of a divine theological reason or will.
Spinoza argues through propositions. He holds the perspective that the conclusion he presents is merely the necessary logical result of combining the provided Definitions and Axioms. He starts with the proposition that "there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute."[5] He follows this by arguing that objects and events must not merely be caused if they occur, but that they must be prevented if they do not. By a logical contradiction, if something is non-contradictory, there is no reason that it should not exist. Spinoza builds from these starting ideas. If substance exists it must be infinite,[6] because if not infinite another finite substance would have to exist to take up the remaining parts of its finite attributes, something which is impossible according to an earlier proposition. Spinoza then uses the Ontological Argument as justification for the existence of God and argues that God must possess all attributes infinitely. Since no two things can share attributes, "besides God no substance can be granted or conceived."[7]
As with many of Spinoza's claims, what this means is a matter of dispute. Spinoza claims that the things that make up the universe, including human beings, are God's "modes". This means that everything is, in some sense, dependent upon God. The nature of this dependence is disputed. Some scholars say that the modes are properties of God in the traditional sense. Others say that modes are effects of God. Either way, the modes are also logically dependent on God's essence, in this sense: everything that happens follows from the nature of God, just as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles. Since God had to exist with the nature that he has, nothing that has happened could have been avoided; and, if God has fixed a particular fate for a particular mode, there is no escaping it. As Spinoza puts it, "A thing which has been determined by God to produce an effect cannot render itself undetermined."
Logical structure of the first six propositions of Spinoza's EthicsPart II: Of the Nature & Origin of the Mind
The second part focuses on the human mind and body. Spinoza attacks several Cartesian positions: (1) that the mind and body are distinct substances that can affect one another; (2) that we know our minds better than we know our bodies; (3) that our senses may be trusted; (4) that despite being created by God we can make mistakes, namely, when we affirm, of our own free will, an idea that is not clear and distinct. Spinoza denies each of Descartes's points. Regarding (1), Spinoza argues that the mind and the body are a single thing that is being thought of in two different ways. The whole of nature can be fully described in terms of thoughts or in terms of bodies. However, we cannot mix these two ways of describing things, as Descartes does, and say that the mind affects the body or vice versa. Moreover, the mind's self-knowledge is not fundamental: it cannot know its own thoughts better than it knows the ways in which its body is acted upon by other bodies.
Further, there is no difference between contemplating an idea and thinking that it is true, and there is no freedom of the will at all. Sensory perception, which Spinoza calls "knowledge of the first kind", is entirely inaccurate, since it reflects how our own bodies work more than how things really are. We can also have a kind of accurate knowledge called "knowledge of the second kind", or "reason". This encompasses knowledge of the features common to all things, and includes principles of physics and geometry. We can also have "knowledge of the third kind", or "intuitive knowledge". This is a sort of knowledge that, somehow, relates particular things to the nature of God.
Part III: Of the Origin & Nature of Emotions
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In the third part of the Ethics, Spinoza argues that all things, including human beings, strive to persevere their perfection of power in being unaffected.[8] Spinoza states that virtue is equal to power (i.e., self-control).[9]
Spinoza explains how this desire ("conatus") underlies the movement and complexity of our emotions and passions (i.e., joy and sadness that are building blocks for all other emotions).[10] Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.
(+) refers to pleasure [...] (-) refers to pain [...] (f) and (i) refer respectively, to feeling and imagining [...]
Proposition 19 would translate:
He who imagines that the loved object (+) is being destroyed (-) feels pain (-). If the loved object (+) is preserved (+), he will feel pleasure (+). Symbolically, this reduces to two equations:
1) [(+) (i)] (-) = [(f) (-)];
2) [(+) (i)] (+) = [(f) (+)].
— Ian S. Miller[11]
Definitions of the Affects
| Term affect | Definition affect | Definition / object |
|---|---|---|
| Joy[10] | passage from | a lesser to a greater perfection. |
| Sadness[10] | passage from | a greater to a lesser perfection. |
| Wonder[10] | an imagination of a thing in which | the mind remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with the others. |
| Disdain[10] | an imagination of a thing which | touches the mind so little that the thing's presence moves the mind to imagining more what is not than what is. |
| Love[10] | a joy accompanied by | the idea of an external cause. |
| Hate[10] | a sadness accompanied by | the idea of an external cause. |
| Inclination[10] | a joy accompanied by | the idea of a thing which is the accidental cause of joy |
| Aversion[10] | a sadness accompanied by | the idea of something which is the accidental cause of sadness. |
| Devotion[10] | a love of | one whom we wonder at. |
| Mockery[10] | a joy born of the fact that | we imagine something we disdain in a thing we hate. |
| Hope[10] | an inconstant joy born out of | the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt. |
| Fear[10] | an inconstant sadness born of | the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt. |
| Confidence[10] | a joy born of the idea of | a future or past thing, concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed. |
| Despair[10] | a sadness born of the idea of | a future or past thing concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed. |
| Gladness[10] | a joy accompanied by the idea of | a past thing which has turned out better than we had hoped. |
| Remorse[10] | a sadness accompanied by the idea of | a past thing which has turned out worse than we had hoped. |
| Pity[10] | a sadness accompanied by the idea of | an evil which has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us. |
| Favor[10] | a love toward | someone who has benefited another. |
| Indignation[10] | a hate toward | someone who has done evil to another. |
| Overestimation[10] | out of love | thinking more highly of someone than is just. |
| Scorn[10] | out of hate | thinking less highly of someone than is just. |
| Envy[10] | hate insofar as it so affects a human that | they are saddened by another's happiness and, conversely, glad at another's ill fortune. |
| Compassion[10] | love insofar as it so affects a human that | they are glad at another's good fortune and saddened by another's ill fortune. |
| Self-esteem[10] | a joy born of the fact that | a human considers itself and its own power of acting |
| Humility[10] | a sadness born of the fact that | a human considers its own lack of power and weakness. |
| Repentance[10] | a sadness accompanied by | the idea of some deed we believe ourselves to have done from a free decision of the mind. |
| Pride[10] | out of love of oneself | thinking more highly of oneself than is just |
| Despondency[10] | out of sadness | thinking less highly of oneself than is just |
| Love of esteem[10] | a joy accompanied by the idea of | some action of ours which we imagine that others praise. |
| Shame[10] | a sadness accompanied by the idea of | some action of ours which we imagine that others blame. |
| Longing[10] | a desire / appetite / sadness | to possess something which is encouraged by the memory of that thing while concurrently restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing wanted. |
| Emulation[10] | a desire for a thing which is generated in us because | we imagine that others have the same desire. |
| Gratitude[10] | a desire / eagerness for love by which | we strive to benefit one who has benefited us from a like affect of love. |
| Benevolence[10] | a desire to benefit | one whom we pity. |
| Anger[10] | a desire by which | we are spurred |
| Vengeance[10] | a desire by which, from reciprocal hate, we are roused | to do evil to one who, from a like affect, has injured us. |
| Cruelty[10] | a desire by which someone is roused | to do evil to one whom we love or pity. |
| Timidity[10] | a desire to avoid | a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser one. |
| Daring[10] | a desire by, which | someone is spurred to do something dangerous which one's equals fear to take on themselves |
| Cowardice[10] | desire is restrained by timidity in | fear of some evil which most people do not usually fear. |
| Consternation[10] | one whose desire to avoid an evil is | restrained by wonder at the evil they fear. |
| Courtesy[10] | a desire to | do what pleases others and not do what displeases oneself. |
| Ambition[10] | an excessive desire for | esteem |
| Gluttony[10] | an immoderate desire for and love of | eating. |
| Drunkenness[10] | an immoderate desire for and love of | drinking. |
| Greed[10] | an immoderate desire for and love of | wealth. |
| Lust[10] | a desire for and love of | joining one body to another. |
Part IV: Of the Servitude of Humanity, or the Strength of the Emotions
The fourth part analyzes human passions, which Spinoza sees as aspects of the mind that direct us outwards to seek what gives pleasure and shun what gives pain. The "bondage" he refers to is domination by these passions or "affects" as he calls them. Spinoza considers how the affects, ungoverned, can torment people and make it impossible for mankind to live in harmony with one another.
Part V: Of the Power of the Intellect, or the Liberty of Humanity
The fifth part argues that reason can govern the affects in the pursuit of virtue, which for Spinoza is self-preservation: only with the aid of reason can humans distinguish the passions that truly aid virtue from those that are ultimately harmful. By reason, we can see things as they truly are, sub specie aeternitatis, "under the aspect of eternity," and because Spinoza treats God and nature as indistinguishable, by knowing things as they are we improve our knowledge of God. Seeing that all things are determined by nature to be as they are, we can achieve the rational tranquility that best promotes our happiness, and liberate ourselves from being driven by our passions.
