Gorgias

Gorgias Summary and Analysis of Gorgias 466a - 480a (How can we distinguish between the good and the appearance of the good?)

Summary

Polus protests Socrates' characterization of rhetoric as flattery, arguing instead that rhetoricians exercise great power in their communities, like dictators. Socrates agrees that rhetoricians are like dictators, but says that's only because they are both the least powerful members of a community. Both rhetoricians and tyrants are unhappy because they do what pleases them in the moment, and not what is truly good, according to Socrates.

The decisive difference comes down to a matter of whether "doing what one thinks is good” is the same as doing what one wants. Socrates uses the examples of bitter medicine and dangerous sea voyages to show the difference. Neither is immediately pleasant; we don't usually "want" to take a bitter medicine or go on an unpleasant voyage. But both can be necessary for one's long-term well-being. Medicine tastes bad, but preserves our health; sea voyages are dangerous, but they can be necessary for business. Socrates continues to draw a distinction between what is good, bad or indifferent. All actions and possessions are indifferent—even the most obviously desirable ones like wealth or social standing. We only pursue them because we believe that they will make us happy in a lasting and durable way.

Polus insists that sometimes we knowingly do bad things—as, for example, when we seek to kill someone who has killed. Socrates rejects executions as hollow displays of power that serve no good to the community. He says that seeking revenge opens the possibility for us to do wrong to the wrong person. In fact, Socrates argues, it is better to be the victim than the perpetrator of wrong. Polus claims that the most important thing is to have an unrestricted ability to pursue one's personal aims. But Socrates forces him to admit that these can be either good or bad, depending on the circumstances. So Polus must think that it is "good" for people to be able to do bad, if it's what they want to do. For Polus, the immoral person is happy as long as he doesn’t get caught.

Socrates replies that Polus' definition hinges on an incoherent understanding of happiness. To illustrate his point, he asks Polus which he thinks is worse for a person's immediate condition: doing wrong or being wronged? Being wronged, says Polus. But then Socrates asks which is more contemptible, that is, which causes greater harm to others? Doing wrong, says Polus. Polus maintains that something is not “worse” just because it is “more contemptible.” Now we see the deep difference between the two interlocutors' views. For Polus, what is "bad" is not necessarily what is "wrong" or contemptible; it is simply what you don't like in the moment. Polus, unlike Socrates, does not identify the admirable with the good or the contemptible with the bad. Polus has a "relativistic" view: what's good is simply what you like, and vice versa.

Socrates clarifies his argument by considering a well-formed, athletic body. A good physique is admirable either because it benefits the man to be healthy or because it is pleasing to look at. Something that is admirable is something that is both pleasant and helpful. Contemptible is the opposite—unpleasant and harmful. Doing wrong is not more unpleasant than suffering it, but it is far more harmful than suffering. Thus, Polus must admit that it is better to suffer than to cause suffering. It appears that the opposition of benefit and harm is more important that the opposition of pleasant and unpleasant, because the first takes others into account, while the second is purely selfish.

Now Socrates must convince Polus that it is better to be punished than not. Polus agrees that acts of justice are always admirable, because they benefit others, and that punishment is the just payment for crimes. Just punishment is when an admirable person punishes a contemptible one. Just punishment is admirable because it does good to the person receiving it. It improves his moral character. Just as there can be financial or physical badness (poverty and ill health), there is also psychological badness (immorality). These are ameliorated by expertise in commercial business, medicine, and justice, respectively.

Socrates argues that psychological affliction is worse than the others, because it is least pleasant and causes the most harm. The criminal will go to many lengths to avoid punishment, because he does not understand that he is mentally unwell. He will employ money, friends and persuasion as needed. Socrates' point is that doing wrong without being caught is the worst thing in the world, because it leaves no chance to overcome your own immorality.

Thus, Socrates begins a discussion of how one should use rhetoric in light of these conclusions. He begins by pointing out that those who have done wrong should be punished as quickly as possible to save them from further moral decay, just as a sick person should see a doctor as quickly as possible. Socrates deduces that rhetoric used in the defense of a guilty person would only obstruct this process and therefore be harmful. If a rhetor truly wanted to use his skill to do harm to an enemy, he would in this case have to help that enemy escape punishment, rather than receive it, since, Socrates has shown, the worst thing for a guilty person is for them to escape punishment. This is the only use for rhetoric, Socrates concludes. Once again, Socrates's interlocutors assume that he is joking.

Analysis

Socrates' discussion with Polus highlights two key themes of Plato's philosophy, which will recur again and again throughout his dialogues. The first is the question of what way of life on earth is most desirable, most happy. As in Plato's Republic, here Socrates' interlocutor suggests the example of a tyrant, a person who possesses immense power and wealth and is sufficiently insulated from the law as well as from public opinion that he can do whatever he wants. In our time, we might consider the dictator of a Third World nation; a wealthy pop star or Silicon Valley billionaire is an equally apt comparison.

Socrates makes the deliberately counter-intuitive argument that such a person is, in fact, not powerful, because they have not mastered their own desires. If this person wants to eat, they eat, if they want to drink, they drink—whatever they want, they can have instantly. Socrates considers this a form of slavery. Constantly getting what we want withers our capacity for free and rational thought, and kills our ability to decide whether what we want is actually good or bad. We should also note here the analogy that Socrates draws between rulership and philosophy, which is a kind of self-rule. In Socrates' time, philosophers were expected to tutor the children of the wealthy to prepare them for government. Socrates argues here that the only truly worthwhile government is the government of the self.

The second theme, which follows on the first, is the distinction between what is pleasurable and what is good. Socrates consistently accuses his interlocutors of only wanting things because they are pleasurable. Rhetoric is not good because it brings wealth to someone who practices it effectively—rhetoric is pleasurable for this reason. Socrates uses this distinction to cast a skeptical light on many of things his society values, like the esteem of politically important people, as well as wealth and power. Philosophy is the tool we use to ask the larger questions of purpose and meaning that Socrates' interlocutors cannot see: what is truly good for human beings? What does the ideal human life look like?

Socrates' argumentation, particularly in this section, can be a bit confusing for several reasons. First, It is difficult to know precisely what to make of Socrates' comparisons, which his interlocutors accept without comment. Does it necessarily follow that if there is a science for the care of the body there is a science for the care of the soul? Not at all. What if there is no soul? What if the one has nothing to do with the other?

Though, as readers, we might not find these arguments wholly convincing, they give us crucial insight into Plato's worldview and the task of his philosophy. These comparisons bolster the sense that philosophy recognizes harmony, similarity, and balance in the world and brings it all together into a coherent whole. Philosophy is not something abstract, but a form of knowledge we apply to ourselves to achieve happiness; though, of course, this happiness might end up being something very different from what we think it will be when we start. Happiness is a kind of health, an inner balance.

Second, Socrates likes to taunt his interlocutors by reaching deliberately counter-intuitive conclusions, like that rhetoricians should accuse themselves before the courts to save their souls. This seems to run counter to Socrates' stated belief in "rational conversation." These conclusions highlight the theatrical aspect of Plato's work. Greek listeners and readers would have recognized Socrates as an Eiron, a figure from Greek comedy who humiliates self-important characters by pretending to be a fool, and tripping them up with his words. For this reason, Socrates lives on in the popular imagination as a stereotypical "wise man," whose strange pronouncements make others consider him foolish.

But Socrates' larger strategy is simply to shake his interlocutors free of their received beliefs. They are not effective conversation partners either because, as he points out to Polus, they simply restate unconsidered opinions—like "wealth is good"—as facts. By seeing that careful thought can lead to truly bizarre and unexpected places, Socrates teaches them a certain humility, that makes them more open to the truth, and to the voice of their own conscience.

Knowledge and understanding, which are beyond one's immediate horizons, are the most important to serving one's true interests. This is real power. And, as per his method, Socrates insists that this general perspective must be reached through direct conversation—not by appeal to the opinions of the masses. In this way, Plato shows us that general truths and the general populace are not to be mistaken for one another.