The Writings of Anselm of Canterbury Anselm of Canterbury

Anselm has been called "the most luminous and penetrating intellect between St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas"[111] and "the father of scholasticism",[41] Scotus Erigena having employed more mysticism in his arguments.[94] Anselm's works are considered philosophical as well as theological since they endeavour to render Christian tenets of faith, traditionally taken as a revealed truth, as a rational system.[139] Anselm also studiously analyzed the language used in his subjects, carefully distinguishing the meaning of the terms employed from the verbal forms, which he found at times wholly inadequate.[140] His worldview was broadly Neoplatonic, as it was reconciled with Christianity in the works of St Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius,[3][c] with his understanding of Aristotelian logic gathered from the works of Boethius.[142][143][41] He or the thinkers in northern France who shortly followed him—including Abelard, William of Conches, and Gilbert of Poitiers—inaugurated "one of the most brilliant periods of Western philosophy", innovating logic, semantics, ethics, metaphysics, and other areas of philosophical theology.[144]

Anselm held that faith necessarily precedes reason, but that reason can expand upon faith:[145] "And I do not seek to understand that I may believe but believe that I might understand. For this too I believe since, unless I first believe, I shall not understand".[d][146] This is possibly drawn from Tractate XXIX of St Augustine's Ten Homilies on the First Epistle of John: regarding John 7:14–18, Augustine counseled "Do not seek to understand in order to believe but believe that thou may understand".[147] Anselm rephrased the idea repeatedly[e] and Thomas Williams(SEP 2007) considered that his aptest motto was the original title of the Proslogion, "faith seeking understanding", which intended "an active love of God seeking a deeper knowledge of God".[148] Once the faith is held fast, however, he argued an attempt must be made to demonstrate its truth by means of reason: "To me, it seems to be negligence if, after confirmation in the faith, we do not study to understand that which we believe".[f][146] Merely rational proofs are always, however, to be tested by scripture[149][150] and he employs Biblical passages and "what we believe" (quod credimus) at times to raise problems or to present erroneous understandings, whose inconsistencies are then resolved by reason.[151]

Stylistically, Anselm's treatises take two basic forms, dialogues and sustained meditations.[151] In both, he strove to state the rational grounds for central aspects of Christian doctrines as a pedagogical exercise for his initial audience of fellow monks and correspondents.[151] The subjects of Anselm's works were sometimes dictated by contemporary events, such as his speech at the Council of Bari or the need to refute his association with the thinking of Roscelin, but he intended for his books to form a unity, with his letters and latter works advising the reader to consult his other books for the arguments supporting various points in his reasoning.[152] It seems to have been a recurring problem that early drafts of his works were copied and circulated without his permission.[151]

While at Bec, Anselm composed:[32]

• De Grammatico
• Monologion
• Proslogion
• De Veritate
• De Libertate Arbitrii
• De Casu Diaboli
• De Fide Trinitatis, also known as De Incarnatione Verbi[41]

While archbishop of Canterbury, he composed:[32]

• Cur Deus Homo
• De Conceptu Virginali
• De Processione Spiritus Sancti
• De Sacrificio Azymi et Fermentati
• De Sacramentis Ecclesiae
• De Concordia

Monologion

The Monologion (Latin: Monologium, "Monologue"), originally entitled A Monologue on the Reason for Faith (Monoloquium de Ratione Fidei)[153][g] and sometimes also known as An Example of Meditation on the Reason for Faith (Exemplum Meditandi de Ratione Fidei),[155][h] was written in 1075 and 1076.[32] It follows St Augustine to such an extent that Gibson argues neither Boethius nor Anselm state anything which was not already dealt with in greater detail by Augustine's De Trinitate;[157] Anselm even acknowledges his debt to that work in the Monologion's prologue.[158] However, he takes pains to present his reasons for belief in God without appeal to scriptural or patristic authority,[159] using new and bold arguments.[160] He attributes this style—and the book's existence—to the requests of his fellow monks that "nothing whatsoever in these matters should be made convincing by the authority of Scripture, but whatsoever... the necessity of reason would concisely prove".[161]

In the first chapter, Anselm begins with a statement that anyone should be able to convince themselves of the existence of God through reason alone "if he is even moderately intelligent".[162] He argues that many different things are known as "good", in many varying kinds and degrees. These must be understood as being judged relative to a single attribute of goodness.[163] He then argues that goodness is itself very good and, further, is good through itself. As such, it must be the highest good and, further, "that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one thing that is supremely good and supremely great—in other words, supreme among all existing things."[164] Chapter 2 follows a similar argument, while Chapter 3 argues that the "best and greatest and supreme among all existing things" must be responsible for the existence of all other things.[164] Chapter 4 argues that there must be the highest level of dignity among existing things and that the highest level must have a single member. "Therefore, there is a certain nature or substance or essence who through himself is good and great and through himself is what he is; through whom exists whatever truly is good or great or anything at all; and who is the supreme good, the supreme great thing, the supreme being or subsistent, that is, supreme among all existing things."[164] The remaining chapters of the book are devoted to consideration of the attributes necessary to such a being.[164] The Euthyphro dilemma, although not addressed by that name, is dealt with as a false dichotomy.[165] God is taken to neither conform to nor invent the moral order but to embody it:[165] in each case of his attributes, "God having that attribute is precisely that attribute itself".[166]

A letter survives of Anselm responding to Lanfranc's criticism of the work. The elder cleric took exception to its lack of appeals to scripture and authority.[158] The preface of the Proslogion records his own dissatisfaction with the Monologion's arguments, since they are rooted in a posteriori evidence and inductive reasoning.[160]

Proslogion

The Proslogion (Latin: Proslogium, "Discourse"), originally entitled Faith Seeking Understanding (Fides Quaerens Intellectum) and then An Address on God's Existence (Alloquium de Dei Existentia),[153][167][i] was written over the next two years (1077–1078).[32] It is written in the form of an extended direct address to God.[151] It grew out of his dissatisfaction with the Monologion's interlinking and contingent arguments.[151] His "single argument that needed nothing but itself alone for proof, that would by itself be enough to show that God really exists"[168] is commonly[j] taken to be merely the second chapter of the work. In it, Anselm reasoned that even atheists can imagine the greatest being, having such attributes that nothing greater could exist (id quo nihil maius cogitari possit).[111] However, if such a being's attributes did not include existence, a still greater being could be imagined: one with all of the attributes of the first and existence. Therefore, the truly greatest possible being must necessarily exist. Further, this necessarily-existing greatest being must be God, who therefore necessarily exists.[160] This reasoning was known to the Scholastics as "Anselm's argument" (ratio Anselmi) but it became known as the ontological argument for the existence of God following Kant's treatment of it.[168][k]

More probably, Anselm intended his "single argument" to include most of the rest of the work as well,[151] wherein he establishes the attributes of God and their compatibility with one another. Continuing to construct a being greater than which nothing else can be conceived, Anselm proposes such a being must be "just, truthful, happy, and whatever it is better to be than not to be".[171] Chapter 6 specifically enumerates the additional qualities of awareness, omnipotence, mercifulness, impassibility (inability to suffer),[170] and immateriality;[172] Chapter 11, self-existent,[172] wisdom, goodness, happiness, and permanence; and Chapter 18, unity.[170] Anselm addresses the question-begging nature of "greatness" in this formula partially by appeal to intuition and partially by independent consideration of the attributes being examined.[172] The incompatibility of, e.g., omnipotence, justness, and mercifulness are addressed in the abstract by reason, although Anselm concedes that specific acts of God are a matter of revelation beyond the scope of reasoning.[173] At one point during the 15th chapter, he reaches the conclusion that God is "not only that than which nothing greater can be thought but something greater than can be thought".[151] In any case, God's unity is such that all of his attributes are to be understood as facets of a single nature: "all of them are one and each of them is entirely what [God is] and what the other[s] are".[174] This is then used to argue for the triune nature of the God, Jesus, and "the one love common to [God] and [his] Son, that is, the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both".[175] The last three chapters are a digression on what God's goodness might entail.[151] Extracts from the work were later compiled under the name Meditations or The Manual of St Austin.[26]

Responsio

The argument presented in the Proslogion has rarely seemed satisfactory[160][l] and was swiftly opposed by Gaunilo, a monk from the abbey of Marmoutier in Tours.[179] His book "for the fool" (Liber pro Insipiente)[m] argues that we cannot arbitrarily pass from idea to reality[160] (de posse ad esse not fit illatio).[41] The most famous of Gaunilo's objections is a parody of Anselm's argument involving an island greater than which nothing can be conceived.[168] Since we can conceive of such an island, it exists in our understanding and so must exist in reality. This is, however, absurd, since its shore might arbitrarily be increased and in any case varies with the tide.

Anselm's reply (Responsio) or apology (Liber Apologeticus)[160] does not address this argument directly, which has led Klima,[182] Grzesik,[41] and others to construct replies for him and led Wolterstorff[183] and others to conclude that Gaunilo's attack is definitive.[168] Anselm, however, considered that Gaunilo had misunderstood his argument.[168][179] In each of Gaunilo's four arguments, he takes Anselm's description of "that than which nothing greater can be thought" to be equivalent to "that which is greater than everything else that can be thought".[179] Anselm countered that anything which does not actually exist is necessarily excluded from his reasoning and anything which might or probably does not exist is likewise aside the point. The Proslogion had already stated "anything else whatsoever other than [God] can be thought not to exist".[184] The Proslogion's argument concerns and can only concern the single greatest entity out of all existing things. That entity both must exist and must be God.[168]

Dialogues

All of Anselm's dialogues take the form of a lesson between a gifted and inquisitive student and a knowledgeable teacher. Except for in Cur Deus Homo, the student is not identified but the teacher is always recognizably Anselm himself.[151]

Anselm's De Grammatico ("On the Grammarian"), of uncertain date,[n] deals with eliminating various paradoxes arising from the grammar of Latin nouns and adjectives[155] by examining the syllogisms involved to ensure the terms in the premises agree in meaning and not merely expression.[186] The treatment shows a clear debt to Boethius's treatment of Aristotle.[142]

Between 1080 and 1086, while still at Bec, Anselm composed the dialogues De Veritate ("On Truth"), De Libertate Arbitrii ("On the Freedom of Choice"), and De Casu Diaboli ("On the Devil's Fall").[32] De Veritate is concerned not merely with the truth of statements but with correctness in will, action, and essence as well.[187] Correctness in such matters is understood as doing what a thing ought or was designed to do.[187] Anselm employs Aristotelian logic to affirm the existence of an absolute truth of which all other truth forms separate kinds. He identifies this absolute truth with God, who therefore forms the fundamental principle both in the existence of things and the correctness of thought.[160] As a corollary, he affirms that "everything that is, is rightly".[189] De Libertate Arbitrii elaborates Anselm's reasoning on correctness with regard to free will. He does not consider this a capacity to sin but a capacity to do good for its own sake (as opposed to owing to coercion or for self-interest).[187] God and the good angels therefore have free will despite being incapable of sinning; similarly, the non-coercive aspect of free will enabled man and the rebel angels to sin, despite this not being a necessary element of free will itself.[190] In De Casu Diaboli, Anselm further considers the case of the fallen angels, which serves to discuss the case of rational agents in general.[191] The teacher argues that there are two forms of good—justice (justicia) and benefit (commodum)—and two forms of evil: injustice and harm (incommodum). All rational beings seek benefit and shun harm on their own account but independent choice permits them to abandon bounds imposed by justice.[191] Some angels chose their own happiness in preference to justice and were punished by God for their injustice with less happiness. The angels who upheld justice were rewarded with such happiness that they are now incapable of sin, there being no happiness left for them to seek in opposition to the bounds of justice.[190] Humans, meanwhile, retain the theoretical capacity to will justly but, owing to the Fall, they are incapable of doing so in practice except by divine grace.[192]

Cur Deus Homo

Cur Deus Homo ("Why God was a Man") was written from 1095 to 1098 once Anselm was already archbishop of Canterbury[32] as a response for requests to discuss the Incarnation.[193] It takes the form of a dialogue between Anselm and Boso, one of his students.[194] Its core is a purely rational argument for the necessity of the Christian mystery of atonement, the belief that Jesus's crucifixion was necessary to atone for mankind's sin. Anselm argues that, owing to the Fall and mankind's fallen nature ever since, humanity has offended God. Divine justice demands restitution for sin but human beings are incapable of providing it, as all the actions of men are already obligated to the furtherance of God's glory.[195] Further, God's infinite justice demands infinite restitution for the impairment of his infinite dignity.[192] The enormity of the offence led Anselm to reject personal acts of atonement, even Peter Damian's flagellation, as inadequate[196] and ultimately vain.[197] Instead, full recompense could only be made by God, which His infinite mercy inclines Him to provide. Atonement for humanity, however, could only be made through the figure of Jesus, as a sinless being both fully divine and fully human.[193] Taking it upon himself to offer his own life on our behalf, his crucifixion accrues infinite worth, more than redeeming mankind and permitting it to enjoy a just will in accord with its intended nature.[192] This interpretation is notable for permitting divine justice and mercy to be entirely compatible[163] and has exercised immense influence over church doctrine,[160][198] largely supplanting the earlier theory developed by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa[111] that had focused primarily on Satan's power over fallen man.[160] Cur Deus Homo is often accounted Anselm's greatest work,[111] but the legalist and amoral nature of the argument, along with its neglect of the individuals actually being redeemed, has been criticized both by comparison with the treatment by Abelard[160] and for its subsequent development in Protestant theology.[199]

Other works

Anselm's De Fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi Contra Blasphemias Ruzelini ("On Faith in the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word Against the Blasphemies of Roscelin"),[41] also known as Epistolae de Incarnatione Verbi ("Letters on the Incarnation of the Word"),[32] was written in two drafts in 1092 and 1094.[41] It defended Lanfranc and Anselm from association with the supposedly tritheist heresy espoused by Roscelin of Compiègne, as well as arguing in favour of Trinitarianism and universals.

De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato ("On the Virgin Conception and Original Sin") was written in 1099.[32] He claimed to have written it out of a desire to expand on an aspect of Cur Deus Homo for his student and friend Boso and takes the form of Anselm's half of a conversation with him.[151] Although Anselm denied belief in Mary's Immaculate Conception,[200] his thinking laid two principles which formed the groundwork for that dogma's development. The first is that it was proper that Mary should be so pure that—apart from God—no purer being could be imagined. The second was his treatment of original sin. Earlier theologians had held that it was transmitted from generation to generation by the sinful nature of sex. As in his earlier works, Anselm instead held that Adam's sin was borne by his descendants through the change in human nature which occurred during the Fall. Parents were unable to establish a just nature in their children which they had never had themselves.[201] This would subsequently be addressed in Mary's case by dogma surrounding the circumstances of her own birth.

De Processione Spiritus Sancti Contra Graecos ("On the Procession of the Holy Spirit Against the Greeks"),[167] written in 1102,[32] is a recapitulation of Anselm's treatment of the subject at the Council of Bari.[93] He discussed the Trinity first by stating that human beings could not know God from Himself but only from analogy. The analogy that he used was the self-consciousness of man. The peculiar double nature of consciousness, memory, and intelligence represents the relation of the Father to the Son. The mutual love of these two (memory and intelligence), proceeding from the relation they hold to one another, symbolizes the Holy Spirit.[160]

De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio ("On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice") was written from 1107 to 1108.[32] Like the De Conceptu Virginali, it takes the form of a single narrator in a dialogue, offering presumable objections from the other side.[151] Its treatment of free will relies on Anselm's earlier works, but goes into greater detail as to the ways in which there is no actual incompatibility or paradox created by the divine attributes.[152] In its 5th chapter, Anselm reprises his consideration of eternity from the Monologion. "Although nothing is there except what is present, it is not the temporal present, like ours, but rather the eternal, within which all times altogether are contained. If in a certain way, the present time contains every place and all the things that are in any place, likewise, every time is encompassed in the eternal present, and everything that is in any time."[203] It is an overarching present, all beheld at once by God, thus permitting both his "foreknowledge" and genuine free choice on the part of mankind.[204]

Fragments survive of the work Anselm left unfinished at his death, which would have been a dialogue concerning certain pairs of opposites, including ability/inability, possibility/impossibility, and necessity/freedom.[205] It is thus sometimes cited under the name De Potestate et Impotentia, Possibilitate et Impossibilitate, Necessitate et Libertate.[41] Another work, probably left unfinished by Anselm and subsequently revised and expanded, was De Humanis Moribus per Similitudines ("On Mankind's Morals, Told Through Likenesses") or De Similitudinibus ("On Likenesses").[206] A collection of his sayings (Dicta Anselmi) was compiled, probably by the monk Alexander.[207] He also composed prayers to various saints.[20]

Anselm wrote nearly 500 surviving letters (Epistolae) to clerics, monks, relatives, and others,[208] the earliest being those written to the Norman monks who followed Lanfranc to England in 1070.[20] Southern asserts that all of Anselm's letters "even the most intimate" are statements of his religious beliefs, consciously composed so as to be read by many others.[209] His long letters to Waltram, bishop of Naumberg in Germany (Epistolae ad Walerannum) De Sacrificio Azymi et Fermentati ("On Unleavened and Leavened Sacrifice") and De Sacramentis Ecclesiae ("On the Church's Sacraments") were both written between 1106 and 1107 and are sometimes bound as separate books.[32] Although he seldom asked others to pray for him, two of his letters to hermits do so, "evidence of his belief in their spiritual prowess".[210] His letters of guidance—one to Hugh, a hermit near Caen, and two to a community of lay nuns—endorse their lives as a refuge from the difficulties of the political world with which Anselm had to contend.[210]

Many of Anselm's letters contain passionate expressions of attachment and affection, often addressed "to the beloved lover" (dilecto dilectori). While there is wide agreement that Anselm was personally committed to the monastic ideal of celibacy, some academics such as McGuire[211] and Boswell[212] have characterized these writings as expressions of a homosexual inclination.[213] The general view, expressed by Olsen[214] and Southern, sees the expressions as representing a "wholly spiritual" affection "nourished by an incorporeal ideal".[215]