Summary:

Alexander Hamilton begins the brilliant discourse on the Constitution of the United States of America by asking his readers to consider a new Constitution because they have experienced the inefficiencies in the present form of government. Classically, he pronounces that the people are in a unique position to answer the most important political question of all ­ "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice." If the people are up to the challenge, their actions will have great worldwide significance. He proceeds to show that many people will oppose the Constitution for a variety of reasons, especially if they benefit from the current form of government. Hamilton, however, is not going to address the motives of those who oppose the Constitution; rather, his intent is to make arguments that are for the Constitution. He addresses people questioning his willingness to listen to his arguments because he has already made up his mind to support the Constitution; however, he admits that, while his motives for urging ratification of the Constitution are personal, his arguments are open.

Finally, he outlines the specific issues that he will address in the Federalist Papers, namely, political prosperity and the Constitution; the inadequacy of the present government to preserve the union, the necessity of a strong and energetic government, the Constitution and its relationship to republican principles of government; the similarity of the proposed Constitution to New York state constitution; and the protection of liberty and property under the proposed government. In addition, he is also attempting to effectively answer serious arguments brought against ratification.

Hamilton concludes the first section of the Federalist Papers by telling the people that it might seem unnecessary to plead for a strong Union, but people argue that the country is too large to establish a national system of government. In the end, however, the last question is whether the people adopt the Constitution or whether they will see the end of a united government.

Analysis

Before beginning a more general analysis of Alexander Hamilton's remarks, it is necessary to provide the background of the political theory of educated men in the United States. First, most educated men, especially those who were at the heart of governing the new country, were extremely familiar with the republics of Ancient Greece and Rome (for example, see John Adam's book Defense of the Constitution, published at the same time as The Federalist Papers). From this background, the primary fear was that while a republican government was desirable in order to defend liberty, it was not possible over a large geographic area, such as the United States, because it had never been accomplished before. Rather, this problem had always been the downfall of Republics (for instance, the fall of the Roman Empire). The other major pitfall of republics had been class war, something that the Founding Fathers had seen in the recent Shay's Rebellion.

More specifically regarding the text, the introduction to the Federalist Papers contains the outline of Hamilton's "argument," the basic points that he wishes to discuss for ratifying the new Constitution. He also explains his motives and those of his cohorts, explaining that this will not be a debate between two sides of the argument, but rather coherently examine the strengths and necessity for the new Constitution. In this article, therefore, the most important part of this paper is the outline that Alexander Hamilton provides, enabling the reader to classify the remaining 84 papers with ease.

It is also interesting to note that the "world-wide" fame that Hamilton speaks of in this essay occurred, just as the Founding Father predicted. Especially in Latin America, but indeed around the world, the United States Constitution that Hamilton defended, has become one of the most copied and admired documents in the history of civilization. Indeed, the Federalist itself was published in Spanish in 1811 by the Venezualan Manuel Garcia de Sana, along with copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In addition, the Federalist influenced movements in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and in Europe. Not only did Hamilton's predictions come true, but his very words were influential far beyond the original thirteen colonies.

In summation, after reading Federalist 1, Hamilton, perhaps more than any of the founders, believed in the future greatness of America; he believed that this nation could be one of power and strength, that such power and strength, far from corrupting the nation's purpose or the rights of individuals, alone could bring to realization the former and protect the latter. The very use of the word Œempire' in this paper is very telling. Characteristically, he looks ahead; he "dips into the future' and sees the Untied States as a world power. While this might not seem odd to the modern reader, in 1788, America was extremely vulnerable to European conquest and domination, not vice versa. His vision for America is even more remarkable under these circumstances.

Summary:

In one of the few articles written by John Jay, the author begins by stating two facts of political life: some form of government is necessary in a society and all forms of government must be granted sufficient power to regulate conflict and administer the laws. The people grant these powers. For Jay, any establishment of government implies that the people grant certain government certain rights that they formerly reserved to only themselves. Given this background, the American people must decide what form of government will best protect their safety and interests. The choice before them is between uniting under one national government and becoming separate states, clearly Jay believes the first is the better option.

Jay continues that there is no longer a common consensus that America's prosperity depends on being firmly united. At the time of writing, some politicians (with increasing amount of supporters) argued that the country should not have a central government, instead existing as separate sovereign states. Jay's aim is to answer this argument. First, he contends, that the country is already united in several natural ways. The geography of the beautiful land suggests that we remain a united people because navigable streams and rivers, a fact that encourages transportation and trade and connects the states. More importantly, he argues that the people worship the same God, come from the same land, speak the same language, have similar manners and customs, and believe in the same principles of government.

For Jay, however, the recently fought, successful Revolutionary War was the main reason to stay united. When the decision was made to form a national government, the states were in a period of crises ­ Jay eloquently describes the houses burning, the citizens bleeding ­ which meant that, by necessity, the government was hastily formed. That Articles of Confederation no longer meet the needs of the new country, given the circumstances surrounding its inception, is not surprising. Jay believes that the United States is fortunate that intelligent men realize the necessity of forming a government now, before rebellions become out of hand. The Constitutional Convention was composed of extraordinary men who deliberated for four months, unwed by power and free from corrupting influences. Their remarkable plan reflects the quality of their deliberations.

Jay concludes that it is significant that this plan is recommended and not imposed. He explains that the framers do not ask for blind acceptance, but rather want sober consideration, equal to the importance of the subject. John Jay concludes by noting that his observation is that the majority of the people are for the new Constitution. Men in their midst who will profit from the separation of the states should not be allowed to "put the continues of the Union in the utmost jeopardy."

Analysis

In this essay, John Jay deals with general arguments that favor a united nation, rather than breaking up and relying on the sovereignty of individual states. Like many of the Federalist Papers, elements within this essay make it much more than merely propaganda in a newspaper, instead, transforming it to a philosophical work on human nature. As Jay describes the reason that government exists at all and the theory regarding natural rights, he transcends his writing and makes the work valuable on a philosophical level about more than a simple defense of the constitution.

In order to fully comprehend Jay's argument against the desolation of a national government and the argument for the sovereignty of states, one must understand the political climate that surrounding this period. As the Articles of Confederation were failing, men were not optimistic about the outcome of the fledging country. Instead, they were asking questions such as "Had the Revolution been a mistake from the beginning? Had the blood and treasurer of Americans spent in seven years of war against England ironically produced republican systems in which rich and poor New Englanders must engage in bloody warfare against each other? Had Independence merely guaranteed a structure in which Virginians and Pennsylvanian would "cut each others throats until one conquered the other or some foreign crown conquered both?" It was under this fear that the Constitution was developed, and with these fears facing the nation, that Hamilton and his partners set out in convincing the nation that the Constitution that came out of the Convention of 1787 was the best possible course for preserving liberty and republicanism in a United nation. His rhetoric concerning the decease of the country, in the conclusion of this essay, therefore, is not merely a scare tactic, as modern readers might interpret, but rather a realistic fear given the state of the political situation in the young country.

It is important to note some of the beliefs and ideals of John Jay, as Federalist #2 is one of the few federalist papers that he wrote (due to sickness, he wrote only 2-5 and 64). Aside from being a strong believer in free government, Jay was a promoter of peace within the United States. As early as 1779, he regretted that Congress, being instituted mainly for the purpose of opposing the tyranny of Britain and for establishing independence, had no authority to interfere in the particular quarrels of the states, feeling that this prevented Congress from settling disputes among the states. Two years later, he continued this philosophy by criticizing the constitution of Massachusetts for describing the state "as being in New England, as well as in America," and wrote "perhaps it would be better if these distinctions were permitted to die away." His biographer relates that Jay even rejoiced that various families were intermarrying with those of other states, because this was conducive to friendship among the states. This essay, therefore, is a natural outgrowth of a long-lived philosophy and hence Jay was a natural collaborator with Alexander Hamilton.

Summary:

John Jay begins by stating that for a number of years, the general consensus among the people is that the best government for the nation would be a national government, invested with sufficient power "for all general purposes." He then says the more that he carefully examines the issues, the more convinced that the people are right. For him, the greatest issue concerning government is the safety of the people and in this essay he will argue that a "cordial Union under an efficient national Government, affords the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad."

Jay argues that wars are proportional to the just causes to go to war, and so by examining whether a United States would have fewer causes versus the separate states, you can discern which form of government would most likely preserve the peace of the land. Jay then tells his readers that America has already formed treaties with six nations, all of which except for Prussia are maritime nations and could readily injure the United States. It is of paramount importance, therefore, to maintain these relationships with these countries, especially considering the importance they hold to commerce in the young nation. To him, it seems that "one national government" could observe the laws of the nation "more perfectly and punctually" than thirteen separate state governments. First, for Jay, one government has available the "best men of the country," in effect, pooling the best men in each state, city, county, etc and utilizing them for one common cause. Thus, the administration, the counsel, and the judicial decisions will be "more wise" in a united government, and create a "safer" situation for foreign affairs to be conducted. Next, Jay argues that treaties in the national government will be argued and executed in the same manner, not in thirteen different ways. In addition, because each state has different desires and wants, persuasion that is not truly for their common good might influence them more than the nation as a whole, and a national government is never subject to making treaties based on local circumstance. Jay also believes that empirical evidence proves his point: while not one Indian war has been provoked by the national government, several states have provoked wars, leading to the "slaughter of many innocent inhabitants."

In sum, "not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national Government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably." Jay concludes by citing an example from history. In 1685, Genoa, a small state, offended Louis XIV and was forced to send their chief magistrate and four of their senators to personally apologize and receive his terms. Jay poses the question would Spain or Britain or "any other powerful nation" had to undergo the same humiliation?

Analysis

All of the essays that John Jay penned for The Federalist Papers deal mainly with the international advantages the adoption of the Constitution would offer and this paper is no different. This essay's basic thrust is that the Constitution is necessary in order to make the United States a powerful force, and thus defend her people and their liberties from foreign attacks or domination. Jay's focus can be accounted for simply: Jay had been closely involved in the diplomacy of the Confederation, for which he had acted as ambassador to Spain and as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and thus knew all the disadvantages to which the Confederation was exposed in foreign relations. His penning this essay, as well as three through five, is extremely appropriate.

Many critics and first time readers of the Federalist Papers argue that Jay had a different agenda and conception of the new Constitution because he was not concerned with the same principles of factions and majorities that Hamilton and Madison concern themselves with, and instead, only concerned about making the country powerful to prevent foreign attacks. This, however, is far from the case. At first sight, it may appear as if Jay's mentioning such ends of the Union as the people's safety and happiness, their life, liberty, and property, means only that these rights will be guaranteed from foreign attacks. However, if we consider the politics of the time in which the challenge of individual rights had its origin main, in the oppressive majority rule which existed in some of the states, and Jay's acute awareness of that situation, we seem to be justified in thinking that Jay, when pleading for the prosperity of America and the rights of her citizens, recognized the danger arising from the then existing democratic despotism and wanted the individual protected from that quarter as much as from the dangers threatening from foreign nations. This is confirmed by him in this federalist paper, when he states that the Union, as established under the constitution, is securing "the preservation of peace and tranquility" not only "against dangers from foreign arms and influence," but also "from dangers of he like kind arising from domestic causes."

There is no reason to believe that Jay conceives of a faction in a different way than his co-authors, when obviously have in mind the infringements upon minority rights under the Articles of Confederation. Jay also complains that Œthe prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith and justice' and is glad that "those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserver." Thus, Jay is not arguing differently, but rather applying the future argument of Madison (for example, in Federalist #10) and Hamilton (Federalist #9) regarding the dangers of factions to the principles of the safety against foreign powers. Jay, therefore, is as fearful of majoriitanism as his co-authors and merely gives another reason to be fearful of factions, that of defending the country from foreign attack.

Summary:

To answer critics that claim the states will prevent conflict between themselves because of the power of commerce, Hamilton says that contrary to belief, it is not in the interest of any nation to cultivate a philosophic spirit with their neighbors. Republics, just as much as monarchies, are addicted to war because both types of government are administered by men, and they can just as easily fall whim to the wants of a few men, just as the republics of Athens, Venice, Holland, and Carthage, commercial republics, fell. Most importantly, Britain, who is extremely active in commerce, has been one of the most warring nations of history. Hamilton also warns against popular, as well as royal, wars, such as in the case of Austria, who fought many popular wars based on the idea of commerce.

Hamilton concludes by warning the people to cease to be foolish, the recent events and the depth to which the country has sunk, should serve as warning. He then quotes another source, claiming "Neighboring States are naturally enemies of each other."

Analysis

The basic thrust of this federalist paper, like 6-9, is discussing "the dangers which in all probability flow from the dissensions between the states themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions," for, Hamilton believed that if the states remained joined in a mere "partial" confederacy, they would inevitably have "frequent and violent contests with each other." The arguments and historic examples given in this essay mirror not only the Convention speech, but also his argument he had written for The Contientalist in 1781.

One thing that becomes clear in this essay is the Founding Father's desperate fear of the states dividing up into separate political entities. Notice that in this essay Hamilton is not arguing against a weaker form of government, or the reinstatement of the Articles of Confederation, rather his fear was of the dissolution of a country at all. To modern readers, this fear might seem silly but in the political climate of the time, without a strong Constitution, the Articles of Confederation would have merely dissolved and the states would have been on their own. His fears, then, however absurd to the reader conscious of the modern superpower and federal government that has made individual states much less powerful than in colonial America, were well-founded.

In future essays, specifically, numbers 18-20, Madison reinforces Hamilton's arguments by an appeal to different historical examples, namely the Amphictonic Council, the Achean League, the Holy Roman Empire, the Swiss Confederation, and the United Netherlands. In writing these essays, Madison, like Hamilton, did not originate new examples, due to the time constraints, but turned to his elaborate research memorandum entitled, "notes of Ancient and Modern Confederacies."

It is interesting to compare Madison's careful and scholarly use of history in his essays with Hamilton's, as it reveals clearly the different personal qualities of the two men. The New Yorker, Hamilton, was not scholarly in his approach to politics; his use of history was that of a propagandist citing examples from the past in order to make a debater's point rather than to establish historical truth. Madison's treatment of Greek confederations was based on widely gathered material from all the available authorities, carefully cross-checked and qualified before being synthesized into a rich study. Hamilton's research considered in superficially extracting bits of a speech of Demosthenes and a hasty reading of Plutarch. This is not to say that on topics in which he was interested Hamilton could not write brilliantly and profoundly. On the problem of war and republican treated in this federalist paper, his thought is both mature and suggestive. But Hamilton was not really interested in the problems of federalism, and even on subjects like war and finance to which his mind was congenial his approach was less of the scholar in politics than of the brilliant publicist.

Summary:

Hamilton begins this Federalist paper by assuming that he, Publius, has proven to his readers that the union provides safety from foreign attack, and wants to proceed and address some of the other consequences of the dissolution of the states. Of paramount interest to Hamilton is "war between the states," something this author believes would be "accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries, where regular military establishments have long obtained." While Europe has many fortifications against military service, the United States has none. Instead, the United States has a wide-open frontier, geography that would create a situation where the "populous states would with little difficulty overrun their less populous neighbors," and war would consequently be more deadly than in Europe. Because of this fact, standing armies would soon become a necessity and standing armies, regardless of the form of government, "compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights." The weaker states would have the first need of standing armies, an institution Hamilton despises, and would thus, in Hamilton's opinion, make the states governments evolve towards monarchy, because during war, a strong executive is necessary. The small states, in Hamilton's suppositions, would have more power over the larger states, and the larger states would result to the same methods of defense that the smaller states first resorted to.

Next, Hamilton distinguishes between countries with military establishments who are frequently subject to invasion, and states that do not deal with this dilemma. A country that is not subject to invasion has no excuse for a standing army, while a country constantly under the threat of an invasion, has an excuse for an army. In a country where there is a standing army because of the constant threat of invasion, people's liberty become infringed upon. Great Britain is a country in the first situation. Because of the sea insulating if from attack, the people would never stand for a standing army, and thus, liberty is defended. Hamilton concludes, "if we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation," thus holding off Europe and her colonies and putting all of the states at the greatest advantage possible.

Analysis

It is interesting that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay (but most of all Hamilton, as the instigator of this project) chose the safety of the nation as the first topic of discussion in the Federalist Papers. While this subject may seem repetitive and almost absurd to the modern day reader, who reads the Federalist Papers for entirely different reasons than to be convinced of the constitution because of the safety of the union, this was the main thrust behind the people's ratification of the Constitution, not the intricacies of federalism or the advantages of the perpetual consideration. Reading this paper it become clear that this was originally intended as a work of propaganda, not a philosophic discourse.

The main thrust behind this paper is that the United States will prevent internal wars by becoming united as a country, rather than fall apart and battle each other, thus creating a political situation that is tenuous at best. The analogies between Europe and the United States are interesting to ponder. Hamilton's belief that the United States would only be insulated from war by joining together leaves an analogous question: would Europe have suffered as many deadly wars had they become an united county, instead of separate, individual states. While this is impossible to answer because the parallels and opportunities were never provided, as well as the fact that the barrier of language and culture was much more of a problem, it is worth noting as an intellectual consideration.

Again in this essay, notice the reoccurrence of the founding father's reliance on ancient Greece as an example. Although Greece does not fit the paradigm that Hamilton is drawing, he feels it is important enough to note why Greece was an exception. In The Federalist Papers, however, the founding fathers were deliberate ­ they were trying to use experience as their guide. John Adams wrote in 1786, "The History of Greece should be to our countrymen what is called in many families on the Continent, a boudoir, an octagonal apartment in a house, with a full-length mirror on every side, and another in the ceiling. The use of it is, when any of the young ladies, or young gentleman if you will, are at any times a little out of humor, they may retire to a place where in whatever direction they turn their eyes, they see their own faces and figures multiplied without end. By thus beholding their own beautiful persons and seeing, at the same time, the deformity brought upon them by their anger, they may recover their tempers and their charms together." Such was the Founding Father's reverence for the history of Greece, something not duplicated in our own culture.

Summary:

Straightforwardly, Alexander Hamilton explains "a firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection." While other republics have provided good examples, they are merely examples and should be used as a starting place, not an ending place because improvements have been made in political science, as well as the other sciences, since their inception. Hamilton trusts that at some point in history, America's constitution will also be a starting place. These improvements include "balances and checks," such as the elected judges and two separate legislative bodies to represent different aspects of the people. After making these assertions, Hamilton makes an astute analogy, comparing the nation and the states to an orbit of planets around the sun, each still being their own entity but all forced to orbit around something more powerful in order to survive.

Hamilton concludes that the utility of a confederacy is to suppress faction, to guard the internal tranquility of States, and to increase their external force and security. For Hamilton, a strong government would be able to suppress rebellions in other parts of the country because they would not have the same ties to the region, an advantage of a larger republic. He believes that people who use Montesquieu's arguments against the size of a nation not being suitable for a republic are false and using the philosopher's words out of context. To try and persuade people that they are wrong, Hamilton quotes the philosopher at length. The majority of Montesquieu's comments that Hamilton uses concern the value of the size of a republic in avoiding internal corruption, domestic factions, and insurrections, not the impossibility of liberty or a republic existing in a large republic.

The author then proceeds to discuss the difference between a confederacy and a consolidation of States. While people believe a confederation to be an alliance with no "object of internal administration," Hamilton believes this position is arbitrary, with no basis in precedent or principle. For him, the definition of a confederate republic is an "assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more States into one State. The rest is the discretion of those involved in forming the government. As long as there is no abolition of state governments, something that is not proposed by the Constitution, the government is indeed a confederation. Hamilton concludes his essay with an example of the Lycian confederacy a government that existed with representation based on the size of the population. Montesquieu, speaking of this association, said "were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia." Hamilton, then, emphasizes that the novelties in the Constitution are not completely new and even approved by the philosopher its critics quoted most frequently.

Analysis

In regards to the essay, it is important to understand Alexander Hamilton's political philosophy in order to clearly view the essay. During the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton proposed to copy the British constitution as closely as possible. In the first place, he advocated the creation of a senate that would correspond to the House of Lords and represent the wealthy few. Recognizing the impossibility of making this upper house hereditary, Hamilton nevertheless hoped to give it strength and power by electing senators for life. The chief "organ" of Hamilton's "strong souled" government, however, was not its senate but its elective king. As Hamilton insisted in Philadelphia, nothing less would check "the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit." This "republican" monarch, like the senate, would be elected for life; he would have power to veto all national legislation, and the prerogative of appointing the governors of all the states, which would thus, under Hamilton's scheme, be reduced to administrative satrapies of the national government. Finally, he hoped this elective king would be given control of the patronage in order to bribe the legislature and insure a steady administration. His study of England had convinced him that this "corruption" was required for a stable government.

This "strong souled" government copied after England's was Hamilton's ideal for America. Only be the establishment of a state which institutionalized in its very organs a "will" independent of the people could the class struggle be allayed in the Untied States. When the Convention turned Hamilton's scheme down in favor of the more democratic and responsible government outlined in the Virginia Plan, he was bitterly disappointed. In July he left the Convention and returned to Philadelphia only for the last sessions. When he signed the Constitution he admitted "no man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his were known to be." He further confessed that this signature was given only because the choice was between "anarchy and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other."

It was in this same spirit of disdain, only partially concealed, that Hamilton wrote as Publius, especially in #9. He was never reconciled to the Constitution's "weakness" as long as he lived. Even while he was preparing to write The Federalist, he drew up a private memorandum in which he prophesied its failure unless additional power could be "squeezed out its clauses by interpretation." Hamilton felt so strongly about the need for an overruling, irresponsible, and unlimited government that it showed through even in his Federalist essays, in spite of his attempt to conceal his opinions in order to achieve ratification. Federalist 9 indicates clearly that he expected a continual use of military force to be required to keep the rebellious poor in their place. In this essay the union is advocated because it will be permit the use of troops raised in one section of the country to stamp out revolts in other districts, an expedient restored to Hamilton during the Whiskey Rebellion.

It is characteristic of the different outlooks of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison that Hamilton, in this Federalist Paper, advocated the new union because it will make it easier to suppress with military forces such outbreaks as Shay's Rebellion, while James Madison, in Federalist #10, argues that the union will prevent the recurrence of any such outbreaks. Hamilton prized the union as an instrument guaranteeing that the rich would win every class struggle; Madison hoped that union would prevent class war from being declared in America. This dichotomy is part of the internal conflict of the Federalist Papers, something that many critics have criticized this document for. In contrary, these two different approaches provide two different aspects of the constitution, allowing both to become an important part of this philosophic document.

Summary:

Madison begins perhaps the most famous of the Federalist papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines that factions are groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interests, and infringe upon the rights of others.

Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact the situation is so problematic that people are disillusioned with all politicians and blame government for their problems. Consequently, a form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.

Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amount of property, they will continue to fraternize with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property; men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those who own businesses. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners, it must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts that result from those who own, and those who do not own, property.

To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: one, to remove its causes and the second to control its effects. The first is impossible. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.

The framers established a representative form of government, a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.

If the new plan of government is adopted, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men ­ the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite might happen. Men who are members of particular factions, or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as ours, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representative chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob.

In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. In this country, leaders of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies ­ to promote, for example, specifically delegated to it; the states, far from being abolished, retain much of their sovereignty. If the framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate objection.

The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capitol, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.

Madison concludes that he presents thee previous arguments because he is confident that those who will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandonment of the idea of combing together in strength ­ the states still have common interests. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."

Analysis

James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the sates as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic was set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor. Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute and irresponsible state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to guarantee both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."

It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in the Philadelphia Convention. His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, was certainly based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in 1787. But Madison's greatness as a statesmen rest in part on his ability quite deliberately to set his limited personal experience in the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations.

His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United Sates and its variety of interests could be made a guarantee of stability and justice under the new constitution. When Madison made this prophecy the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. it was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in 1752, that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay Hume disclaimed any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world. " At the end of Hume's essay was a discussion that could not help being of interest to Madison. For here the Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world." Hume said the " in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest." Hume's analysis here had turned the small-territory republic theory upside down: if a free state could one be established in a large area, it would be stable and safe from the effects of faction. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic.

In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April 1787, eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights? Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general . . . good" second, "respect for character" and finally, religious scruples. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party.

When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The facile domination of faction that had been a commonplace in English politics for a hundred years, as Whig and Tory vociferously sought to fasten the label on each other. But the Scot, very little interested as a partisan and very much so as a social scientist, treated the subject therefore in psychological, intellectual, and socioeconomic terms. Throughout all history, he discovered, mankind has been divided into factions based either on personal loyalty to some leader or upon some "sentiment or interest" common to the group as a unit. This latter type he called a "Real" as distinguished form the "personal" faction. Finally, he subdivided the "real factions" into parties based on "interest, upon principle," or upon affection." Hume spent well over five pages dissecting these three types; but Madison, while determined to be inclusive, had not the space to go into such minute analysis. Besides, he was more intent now on developing the cure than on describing the malady. He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The tenth Federalist reads" "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex ad oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good." It is hard to conceive of a more perfect example of the concentration of idea and meaning than Madison achieved in this famous sentence.

Summary:

Hamilton begins by telling the people that in the previous papers he has tried to convince them of the importance of the Union to "political safety and happiness." In this essay, he changes the theme to the "insufficiency of the present confederation to the preservation of the union." He argues that the majority of the people agree that the present form of government will eventually lead to "impending anarchy." He continues that the United States has reached the "last stage of national humiliation," because of large debts, territories in the possession of a foreign power, a lack of military, a lack of money, inability to navigate on the Mississippi River, lack of commerce, lack of respect by foreign powers, decrease in value of property, and unavailability of credit. In sum, because of "national disorder, poverty, and insignificance." Hamilton urges that because of these ills the country must firmly stand for safety, tranquility, dignity, and reputation. He attacks the supporters of the Article of Confederation, claiming that though they admit that the government is destitute of energy, they stand against "conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy," wanting instead, something that is impossible, the augmentation of federal powers without decreasing the powers of the states.

To Hamilton, the biggest problem in the existing government is the principle of legislation for states in a collective manner, which creates multiple sovereigns. Under this situation, the laws of the nation, though constitutionally binding, become merely suggestions that the states can choose to follow or not follow. While he sees nothing wrong with compacts between states, treaties that exist throughout the world, from experience he believes that little dependence can be placed on such agreements. He believes that the states of the country could stand in similar relation to each other, it would not be ideal but would be "consistent and practicable." But if there is still some desire for a national government, it must take on different characteristics from a league of governments: we must extend "the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens, the only proper objects of government." The very idea of a government implies the power of making laws and those laws must contain a consequence, a penalty, applied by the military or the court. Because no system exists under the Articles of Confederation that properly carries out the law (no national court system), the government was useless.

For Hamilton, government was created because the passions of men do not conform to the "dictates of reason and justice" and groups of men act with greater intelligence than individuals alone. Hamilton supposes that this is because reputation has a less active influence.

In addition, he believes that because of the nature of sovereign power, people become obsessed with their own power. A meeting of many sovereign powers, then, like the Articles of Confederation, creates problems because a love of power means that people fail to compromise. The business of the government, therefore, cannot be carried out under this system and national interests become subservient to individual desires and wishes. Alexander Hamilton, finally, specifically attacks the Articles of Confederation as failing because the system was destined to fail. It did not happen all at once, but instead, gradually, progressing to the point that things have become a "stand-all," with everyone "yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest and convenience, Œtill the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads and to crush us beneath its ruins."

Analysis

In this essay, Hamilton theoretically examines the flaws with a national government that contains multiple sovereigns. During the majority of the essay, (after outlining problems of the United States and things the country should be embarrassed of), he does not attack the Articles of Confederation specifically; instead, he generally laments the basic problems with a particular type of system of government that contains multiple sovereigns, and then, only at the end of the paper, states that the problems are not based on the Articles of Confederation, but any form of government that has this philosophical basis. In later papers (16-22), Hamilton will examine more specifically the many problems that plague the present form of government. In this essay, however, he lays the philosophical problems of the type of government, inferring that one must start completely over before he attacks in detail the specific problems of the country.

Both Madison and Hamilton were convinced that local sovereignty had to be abolished, something that they were much more open about in their private correspondence, their public statements more political. Neither Hamilton nor Madison wanted to see the sates absorbed entirely into a national government, but neither thought that that was likely. It seemed inconceivable to them that a central authority could or would want to descent to enforcement of local laws.

It has to be recognized that the U.S. Constitution and the Articles of Confederation allocated power and wealth differently and hence some groups would be hurt and others benefited by a change in the regime. The arguments used against the Article of Confederation, in many people's opinion, while a classic in political theory were not the primary influence in the ratification of the new Constitution. Instead, as some critics argue, opposition to the proposed Constitution came from those groups whose economic and political position within the state would be threatened by the new order, not by those who opposed it ideologically. The Federalist won so strongly because of agenda control. For example, the Federalists made sure that the states strongly in favor voted first while they delayed votes in those states where the people were opposed, not because of the threatening and ominous language presented in papers such as this.

Summary:

Hamilton begins this discourse restating that it is an absolute fact that the present confederation, because of the manner in which it has been set up, is the "parent of anarchy," and that the delinquencies of the states of the Union are the "natural offspring" and will lead the country to Civil War. From this point, Hamilton proceeds to hypothetically go through the consequences of a lack of a large, standing, national army. In Hamilton's opinion, the end would be a war between the states because the strongest state is likely to prevail in any disagreement between the states with no national army to put the states in their proper place. This would be the violent death of the confederacy. The other alternative would the "natural death," what Hamilton thought the country was in the midst of at the time of the writing of the Federalist Papers. If there is not war between the sates, the states would simply do their own biding, disregarding the federal government, and the federal government's power would erode until it was completely eradicated.

At this point, Hamilton reminds his reader that the country should prefer a national constitution, and one that has provisions for a large army, "continuously on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government." While some of the critics of the constitution want to believe that there is an alternative, anything else is impractical. From this argument for a standing army, Hamilton proceeds to discuss the necessity of not governing merely the states, but of the government having power over the individual. The government must "carry its agency to the persons of the citizens." Hamilton proceeds to argue that the individual state legislatures should not have to approve the laws because they could disregard the laws and their disregardation would ruin the system of law in the country. Unity of the country is the most paramount thing, and the only way unity can occur is through a strong, national government. Alexander Hamilton concludes his essay by claiming that no government can always avoid or control those who will be disorderly, but it would be "vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities."

Analysis

This essay continues Alexander Hamilton's theme of the importance of the government to the unity of the country. While this is apparent from the conclusion of the essay, how does the first part of the essay fit with the second part? A standing, national army represents the nation's right to enforce the laws on all of it's citizens and only by having power over the individual, do you have the right to arrest them, to imprison them, and to set them free. This same right also lets the government avoid having to deal with the individual agendas of the differing states. In an essence, you bypass their concerns and create a more national government, in Hamilton's turns, able to effectively preserve the "general tranquility."

This essay belongs to the second major division of The Federalist, the commentary on "the insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the Union." While Hamilton wrote 15, 16, and 17, Madison, however, was to write three of the essays of this section, for his careful research on the subject made him more competent than Hamilton to compare the "vices" of the Confederation with the weaknesses of other historic confederacies. Thus, after Hamilton, in Federalist 15, 16, 17 had developed the theme that no national government could endure unless it had jurisdiction over the individuals in the states rather than over the states in their corporate capacities, Madison took up his pen again. In Number 18, 19, and 20, he enforced Hamilton's arguments by an appeal to the history of the Amphictyonic Council, the Achaean League, the Holy Roman Empire, the Swiss Confederation, and the United Netherlands. Madison in writing thee essays merely had to turn to his elaborate research memorandum entitled, "Notes of Ancient and Modern Confederacies."

It is interesting to note that Hamilton's conviction regarding peace within the states was not a newfound philosophy, but rather, a long-standing belief. During the Revolutionary war, he feared dissensions among the members of the Confederation. Stating that the republics of the Greek leagues as well as the Swiss cantons were continually at war with each other in spite of the vicinity of foreign powers, Hamilton warned that the danger of interstate tensions was considerably greater in America, due to the absence of strong neighbors. He was concerned about disputes over state boundaries, and regretted that the prospects of future tranquility were not flattering. In The Continentals, published in 1782, Hamilton again reproached the states for their mutual jealousy. When he congratulated Washington at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace, he added a note of caution, saying that "the centrifugal is much stronger than the centripetal force in these States ­ the seeds of disunion much more numerous than those of union." He remained concerned about the harmony among states throughout his entire life.

Summary:

Hamilton begins this essay by saying that in addition to the problems of the Article of Confederation that have already been discussed, there were others, of equal importance that also need to be addressed.

First, both Federalists and anti-Federalists agree that the lack of power to regulate commerce among the several states and between this government and foreign nations has created an abominable situation. For Hamilton, this is the biggest problem that motivates a stronger form of government. Foreign governments are understandably reluctant to enter into trade agreements or treaties with us knowing that the individual states can (and do) violate, at their whim, the terms of these agreements. Under these circumstances, the United States cannot develop a favorable balance of trade or enjoy diplomatic relationships. In addition, the lack of uniform trade regulation has resulted in considerable animosity among the states. It is of the utmost importance that the national government have the power to regulate commerce.

Next, Hamilton addresses the subject of the military, a power that under the confederation as merely "making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men." This system, during the Revolution, however, was found wanting because it created competition between the states, "an auction for men." Several states promised their male citizens more money than other states were paying, and men, in attempt to force their states to increase military pay, delayed enlisting. This competition among the states, a type of blackmail, created dangerous situations, including confusion, expense, inefficiency, and undisciplined troops. Nothing but the "enthusiasm of liberty induced the people to endure." Besides the difficulties this situation created, it also was unfair because the states closest to the center of the war inevitably made the largest effort to meet their quotas; those farthest away from the fighting made little or no effort to meet them.

Another issue that Hamilton feels necessitates the new constitution is "the right of equal suffrage among the states." Under the Articles of Confederation, all the states, whether large or small, were represented equally in the Congress. This system, however, means that in reality the people are unequally represented. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland constitute a majority of the states, but they do not contain one-third of the population. Thus, this situation violates the republican principles of majority rule. The citizens of the small states must realize that, sooner or later, the citizens of the large states will protest such an unfair arrangement. When that happens, the stability and welfare of the country will be threatened. A situation in which a responsible majority is frequently coerced by a small minority could result in anarchy. The other problem that arises from this legislative situation (a national government controlled by a legislative minority) is that the government is vulnerable to foreign influence and corruption. It is difficult for a foreign government to influence a governing majority but relatively easy for them to corrupt or influence a powerful few.

The other defect that Hamilton feels is severe is the lack of a Supreme Court, a body necessary to define and interpret the laws, as "laws are dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation." In addition, a Supreme Court is needed to interpret and enforce the terms of treaties. A court is given more importance in the United States where laws can conflict. A government cannot exist if local biases and narrow interests dominate the national discourse.

Last, Hamilton attacks the ratification of the Articles of Confederation. Because the Articles of Confederation were ratified by the state legislatures, Hamilton argues that they lack power and could be dismissed easily. Instead, he believes that "the fabric of American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people."

Analysis

The entirety of this federalist paper, like that of federalist papers 1-22, is devoted not to promoting the new constitution, but rather, examining the flaws in the existing Articles of Confederation. When this was originally published, Saturday December 15, 1787, it marked the completion of the second formal section of the work. Hamilton focuses on five basic themes, all falling under the theme of the strength of federalism, in an attempt to convince the general public of the inadequacies of the present type of government. These themes include the problems dealing with commerce, military, courts, representation, and the ratification of the Articles of Confederation.

Differences and similarities between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison can be gleaned from this paper written by Hamilton. Like Madison, Hamilton beloved that democratic excesses in these states threatened the individual's rights, Hamilton wants free government secured through a federal guarantee of the state constitutions. Unlike Madison, Hamilton fears that factions in one state may cause trouble in other states rather than being absorbed and neutralized. Therefore, as later papers demonstrate, Hamilton believes in the concentration of power in the national government. Above all, this article emphasizes the need for "an entire change" of the "radically vicious and unsound" system of the Articles of Confederation.

Interestingly, there were extreme difficulties of penning the Federalist in the short amount of time necessary before the New York ratifying convention met. Luckily, before he even began penning the papers, Hamilton had worked out a detailed outline a substantial percentage of the essays he had contracted to write for The Federalist. The first two topics to be discussed by Publius were "The utility of the Union" and "The insufficiency of the present Confederation." Hamilton had covered exactly those subjects in the opening pages of a speech delivered at the Constitution Convention. Hamilton, therefore, had a quantity of material recently used at Philadelphia that was presented again, like this essay. Hamilton used the same ideas, theories, and historical examples that he had already used in the convention, thus facilitating the rapid publication of the first essays.

Summary:

The "necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union," is the topic of this Federalist paper authored by Alexander Hamilton. He outlines three main points, first, what the Federal Government should provide, second, the amount of power necessary to carry out their positions, and third, who in the government should do this. The third point, however, will be discussed later. To Hamilton, the answer to the first question is that the principal purpose of the Union is the common defense of the members, the preservation of public peace, the regulation of commerce, and the conducting of foreign affairs. In order to create a common defense, you have to be able to raise armies, to build and equip fleets, and to create rules for the government of both. Hamilton believed that these powers should exist without limitation because it is impossible to foresee future emergencies. To Hamilton, the means justify the ends in this case of a strong military.

Hamilton believes that even the Articles of Confederation believed that this was extremely important, because there were provisions for Congress to make unlimited requisition of men and money to direct their operations. These requests, however, failed because the states did not have any binding interest. This failure shows us that "we must extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America." In sum, "the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets, and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an arm and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments."

Hamilton continues that the government must have the power to "pass all laws and make all regulation" which pertain to the common safety of the union. If people argue that these powers should not be given to the federal government, Hamilton believes they are sorely mistaken. "A government, the Constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers, which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depository of the national interests," a situation that the Articles of Confederation have created. Hamilton concludes, It must be fixed.

Analysis

While many of the Federalist Papers seem repetitive, emphasizing the same points over and over again, it is important to remember that the Federalist Papers, were not designed to belike a book, read cover to cover, expounding the strengths of the Constitution, but rather, a piece of propaganda appearing in a newspaper. Clearly, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison did not assume that their readers were familiar with all of their words and hence the repetitive nature of their work.

The "precious advantage" that the United States had in 1787 that offered hope for a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government' ­ the circumstance which would delay the necessity of accepting Hamilton's favored form of mixed monarchy ­ lay in the predominance of small freehold farmers among the American population. Since the time of Aristotle, it had been recognized that yeoman farmers ­ a middle class between the greedy rich and the envious poor ­ provided the most stable foundation upon which to erect a popular government. This factor, commented on by Madison, Pinckney, Adams, and others, helps explain why the Convention did not feel it necessary to sacrifice either majority rule or popular responsibility in their new Constitution.

It is interesting to note that the plan that Hamilton defends in this paper was not Œtheoretically' the soundest. The leaders of the Convention realized that a theoretical best ­ and member after member went on record praising the British constitution as the best ever created by man ­ a theoretical best might be the enemy of a possible good. As Pierce Butler insisted, in a different context, "The people will not bear such innovationsŠSupposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best government he could devise, but the best they would receive."

Summary:

Madison begins this Federalist Paper by clearly stating that in order to convince the readers that a government must be at least as energetic and strong as the one proposed, they must carefully examined the defects of the existing government. Madison does not expect people to accept the merits of the constitution on faith alone. By examining the provisions of the constitution and comparing each provision, Madison will attempt to calculate the effects of the new government on the nation and its citizens.

For Madison, it is one of the ironies of human affairs that important public matters are seldom examined objectively. A new plan of government excites passion and prejudices, not surprisingly. The founding fathers believed those who oppose the constitution only briefly looked at it's contents. But some who write in favor of the Constitution are guilty of the same and much of the information lacks substance and critical analysis. There is, however, one critical difference between the supporters and critics of the Constitution: those who support the Constitution superficially usually do so because they know the existing government is weak and the country is in a serious situation, a forgivable fault. The critics, however, cannot be forgiven. Madison is not writing, however, to either of the two biased groups. Instead, this paper is written for those who sincerely are in favor of and want to promote the welfare of the country and who will listen to reasonable arguments and explanations. In order to appreciate the proposed government, you have to realize that no plan is faultless. The Convention, like all groups, was composed of fallible men ­ fallible men drafted the Constitution and fallible men in the end will judge it.

Madison argues that the readers must not only accept the fallibility of men, but also try to understand the difficult task the framers faced. What was done in Philadelphia had no precedent. The framers began their deliberations knowing that the structure of government was weak because the underlying principles that governed it were unsound. They realized that they could not erect a strong structure upon a weak foundation. Unfortunately, the principles to build the constitution were hard to find because the framers could not look to other confederacies because they, too, were founded on unsound principles. Studying both ancient and modern confederacies served only to warn them of what should be avoided in the establishment of the new government. As a result, the framers took as their "textbook" the experience of this and other countries, not political theories.

One of the most important and difficult problems was how to establish an energetic and stable government without threatening the liberties of the people. Had the framers not solved this problem, they would have failed. Stability in government promotes confidence and is essential to national character. Stability is threatened if too many people hold power, and energetic government requires that the execution of the laws should be the responsibility of one man, the president. But in a free society power is derived from the people and those who hold office are responsible to them. The proposed government reconciles and balances these two important values. Stability is achieved through the principle of representation; liberty is protected because the government rests upon the consent of the people. In addition, a part of this balance was achieved by establishing relatively short terms of office for representatives, senators, and the president.

Another problem the framers faced was how best to divide authority and power between the state and national governments, something that was extremely difficult. The framers also had to wrestle with the problem of describing in specific detail the purpose and limits of different codes of laws and types of courts. The English studied this problem for years, but never came up with specific solutions. No language supplies words and phrases for every complex idea or is so precise that every word has only one meaning. The Convention also faced other problems. The delegates had to reconcile the conflict and competition between the large and small states, as well as the fact that competing sectional interests had to be reconciled, as did various economic and social conflicts within every state. These competing interests will undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on the proposed government, but to reconcile them during the Convention was a difficult task.

Madison concludes by remarking that is remarkable given all of the pressures and difficulties that an agreement was reached at all. While it is easy for a theorist to plan a perfect document in the privacy of his den or imagination, for men to hammer out their differences together is another matter. Madison attributes two factors to the success of the Constitutional Convention: first, the framers were free of party animosities and second, the delegates were so pleased with the final product that they were willing to put aside certain personal objections in order to avoid further delay or the necessity of drafting an entirely new document.

Analysis

Federalist Number 37 is the beginning of another of James Madison's clump of work. Hamilton's series of fourteen papers on the vital need for an energetic constitution stated ended with Number 36, published on January 8, 1788. On January 11, Madison commenced with 37 explaining how the Convention had combined "energy in government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form." In this division of the work so peculiarly suited to his talent he had occasion not only to develop the federal principles of the Constitution, but also to discuss in his own characteristic vein the various questions that lie at the foundation of free government itself. And although twelve of the twenty-four essays he wrote in this section have been claimed by Hamilton, examinations of the papers themselves show they were indubitably written by Madison.

Madison's' first two essays, not only 37 but also 38, were devoted to the difficulties faced by the Convention in guaranteeing both the security of the few and the liberty of the many. Madison's thoughts on the relationship of liberty and authority are interesting, because this is a problem that had been his chief concern since he had entered politics. He eloquently wrote in Federalist 37, "Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger and to that prompt and salutary execution of the law, which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in government is essential to national character. . . On comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them in their due proportions."

While Madison complains in this Federalist paper that the founding fathers had no guides, this is not completely true as they relied heavily upon the philosophers of their time and of earlier times. Raynal, Delome, Montesquieu, and Hume, are, among others, expressly mentioned and quoted within the Federalist Papers themselves, but these writers do not exhaust the list of those whose impact on the Papers is obvious. Machiavelli, and Hume; Hobbes and Rousseau; Harrington, Coke and Clackston, and above all Locke, were all intellectual forebears of the Federalist's discussion of constitutional democracy. While some of theses authors were fundamentally accepted by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, others were probably fundamentally rejected. No one philosophy was taken over completely or, for that matter, completely rejected.

It is probably no exaggeration, however, to say that Locke exercised a greater influence upon American political thought during the revolutionary era than any other philosopher. His writings were the colonists' major work of reference in their struggle with the mother country. The Declaration of Independence was so close to the Second Treatise of Government in form, phraseology, and content that Jefferson was accused of copying from it. Locke's influence can be seen in state declarations and constitutions. His ideas were present in the Philadelphia Convention. They played an important role thereafter, as well. Locke is the philosopher to whom the authors of the Federalist are most indebted for an exposition of constitutionalism and free government.

Summary:

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not the framers established a republican form of government. No other form is suited to the particular genius of the American people; only a republican form of government can carry forward the principles fought for in the Revolution or demonstrate that self-government is both possible and practical.

Madison asks the question, what are the distinctive characteristics of the republican form of government? Unfortunately, Madison continues, one cannot find the answer by reading certain books which purports to describe the constitutions of republican nations. For example, Holland, Venice, and Poland are described by political writers as republics, but the power in all three governments is not derived from the people; it is held by kings, nobles, or a small group of people. Since the term "republic" is loosely used, we must look to the theoretical principles of republicanism as they have been defined.

A republican form of government is one which derives its powers either directly or indirectly from the people and is administered by persons who hold public office for a limited period of time or during good behavior. No government can be called republican that derives its power from a few people or from a favored and wealthy class. The Constitution confirms to these republican principles. The people directly elect the House of Representatives; in addition, the people indirectly select the senators and the president. Even the judges will reflect the choice of the people since the president appoints them, and the senate confirms their appointment. The president, senators, and representatives hold office for a specified and limited term; judges are appointed for life ­ subject, however, to good behavior. The constitutional prohibition against granting titles of nobility and the guarantee to the states that they shall enjoy a republican form of government is further proof that the new government is republican in nature.

These facts, however, Madison continues addressing the critics of the Constitution, do not satisfy all people. Some people claim that the Convention destroyed the federal aspect of the government by taking away too much power from the states. According to these opponents, the framers established a national form of government ­ one in which the citizens' area acted upon directly -- as citizens of the nation instead of citizens of the states. In reality, the proposed government contains both national and federal characteristics. It is true that the national government has authority over individuals as national citizens, but in many important respects the new plan of government is clearly federal in its form. The principle of federalism (division of power between the states and the national government) is reflected in the suggested method of ratification. The delegates to the ratifying conventions will vote as citizens of their states, not as citizens of the nation. The federal form is also reflected in the structure of the Senate in which the states are equally represented. The fact that the states retain certain exclusive and important powers is further proof of the federal nature of the proposed government. But we are not going to claim that there are no national features. Of course there are. Madison concludes that the government in its structure is both national and federal; in the operation of its powers, it is nation; in the extent of its power, it is federal.

Analysis

This essay, concerning the republican nature of the Constitution, is one essay that critics point to as having a "split personality" with previous essays that Hamilton had penned, that is, Madison being more conciliatory towards the federal aspects of the government, while Hamilton only expounding on the nationalistic aspects of the new government. The split personality of the Federalist can be considered the root of the dualism that became so characteristic of American constitutional development. The disagreement over the nature of the Union may have contributed to nullification and succession or, for that matter, to the fight against these institutions. Likewise, Hamilton's and Madison's differing opinions on federalism were used when the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution and largely account for that Court's oscillation between dual federalism and nationalism. Also, the authors different conceptions of the separation of powers seem to mark the beginning of a struggle between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, evident throughout American history.

The originality of the Federalist papers, and the Constitution itself, means that these men were confronted with a genuinely democratic problem and succeeded in solving that problem, as Madison denotes here. This alone constitutes enormous progress in the theory and practice of government, as it existed up to their time. Former generations had been concerned largely with the question of how to restrict monarchial absolutism and had been confronted with the choice of monarchy or popular government. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, on the other hand, conceived of popular government as the very premise for their arguments. They did not ask whether popular government should take the place of monarchy, as their predecessors had done. That question had been answered in 1776. Rather, they asked about the degree of democracy and majority rule.

Their answer was that of men who believed in the individualism of the English heritage and their intellectual environment. They bought forth their own concept of free government, under which the popular majority, while governing, was restricted by a constitution for the sake of the freedom of the individual and under which the democratic principle of popular participation in government, as a mere means, was subordinate to the liberal principle of the protection of the individual, as the end of government. Madison's description of the republican form of government, therefore, is significant because it is such a note-worthy and novel concept in the time. The founders had solved the democratic problem in an ingenious manner, a problem that has plagued the European nations throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

Summary:

James Madison begins this paper by telling his readers that he is going to examine a specific principle of republican government, "separation of powers." One of the principal objections to the constitution is that it violates this important principle. Its opponents claim that the three branches of government are not sufficiently separate and independent and that power is too unevenly distributed. It is feared that the new government will collapse, and that liberty will be threatened.

Madison agrees with those who place great importance on the separation of powers, especially on the point that an unequal division of power could result in the loss of liberty. If one branch has too much power, it does not matter how many men govern or how they obtain office. Too much power in one branch of government "is the very definition of tyranny." If these claims were true, Madison says that no other arguments would need oppose it. He, however, is convinced that this charge cannot be supported. The question is; how separate should each branch of government be?

Montesquieu, the French political writer, formulated this principle of government. He took the British constitution as his model‹which he called, "the mirror of political liberty." However, the most casual glance at that constitution reveals that the branches of the British government are far from totally separate or distinct. For example, the English king acts in a legislative capacity when he enters into treaties with foreign sovereigns: once treaties are signed they have the force of legislative acts. The English king not only appoints and removes judges; he frequently consults them. The judicial branch, then, acts in an advisory capacity to the executive branch. The legislative branch advises the king on constitutional matters and, in cases of impeachment, the Houses of Lords assumes judicial power. From these few facts, Madison infers that Montesquieu, when he wrote that "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person . . . or, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers," did not mean that the powers should remain absolutely separate or that each branch should not have any control over the other branches.

Madison continues that if one looks at the state constitutions, there is no state in which the branches of government are absolutely separate and distinct. The state constitutions do not violate the separation of power doctrine set forth by Montesquieu, Madison concludes, and neither does the United States Constitution.

Analysis

In this essay, Madison clearly delineates his philosophy concerning separation of powers. Calling the accumulation of legislative, executive, and judicial power in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, the very definition of tyranny, Madison considers their separation essential to the preservation of liberty. He points out that when the legislative and executive powers are united there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Furthermore, "were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subjects would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."

This was not the only time that Madison had talked about the separation of power. Before the first Congress, Madison said on June 17, 1789, that the principle of the separation of powers "is to be found in the political writings of the most celebrated civilians and is everywhere held as essential to the preservation of liberty . . . ; and if in any case they are blended, it is in order to admit a partial qualification, in order more effectually to guard against an entire consolidation."

The authors of the Federalist took a rather cautious attitude toward legislative supremacy. In their desire to secure free government, they were in favor of a system of government under which the legislature would not be more important than the other branches of government. This led them to follow the classic exponent of the separation of powers, Montesquieu. The Frenchman provided the additional machinery that was necessary to make a reality of the ideal of a government of laws and not of men, combined with the Lockeian concept of free government and the sacrosancity of property.

Summary:

In the last paper, Publius begins by telling the reader that we discussed some of the issues raised by the doctrine known as "separation of powers." This principle of republican government does not imply that the three branches out to be completely separate and independent. The very opposite is true. In order that this doctrine can operate effectively, each branch of government must have sufficient power to impose some restraints over the other two.

The Constitution grants to each branch certain exclusive powers. These powers should not be interfered with; however, power not carefully controlled tends to expand. Our first task is to understand and distinguish the differences between legislative, executive, and judicial power. This is necessary to protect the legitimate powers of each branch.

It is not enough to simply set forth on paper what the proper boundaries are. There must be some latitude, some overlap, in the definition of powers assigned to each branch. Experience with our state governments has shown that theoretical checks written into the state constitutions are inadequate, particularly in preventing the growth of legislative power. The most serious mistake made by the framers of republican forms of government is that they concerned themselves exclusively with the problem of too much executive power. They forgot that legislative tyranny is as evil as executive tyranny.

In hereditary monarchies the king is feared; in direct democracies the executive is also feared because the legislative branch is too large to effectively check the executive, and power is so highly diffused that conflicts are difficult to resolve. In direct democracies, the legislature cannot tyrannize because it cannot govern.

In the proposed government, however, it is the legislative branch that is most likely to abuse power. More power, both unrefined and unlimited, has been granted to it than to the other two branches. In addition, the legislative branch controls the money and has the greatest influence in the determination of salaries paid to government employees. Such a situation invites corruption. Presidential power, on the other hand, is simpler in nature, and the Constitution clearly defines and limits it. The same is true of judicial power. Any attempt by these two branches to infringe upon the Congress would be quickly detected and blocked.

Analysis

The idea of separation of powers was, of course, not new, nor novel to the founding fathers. Plato and Polybius were concerned with it in their discussion of a mixed state, and the concept of a tempered or mixed monarchy was a familiar one during the Middle Ages. In England, the struggle between the crown and the courts of common law, and between the crown and Parliament, had given concrete importance to the separation of powers. Harrington had considered it a prerequisite for free government, and Locke had given it a subsidiary role in his theory of parliamentary supremacy. However, the idea of mixed government had never had a definite meaning. It had connoted a balancing of social and economic interests, or a sharing of power by such corporations as communes or municipalities. Often, the concept was proposed as a remedy against extreme centralization and as a reminder that a political organization would only work if there existed some degree of comity and fair dealing between its various parts. It was Montesquieu who modified the ancient doctrines by making the separation of powers into a system of legal checks and balances between the parts of a constitution.

Montesquieu's idea, which was derived inductively from a study of the English constitution, gained a great deal of popularity in America. After having been hailed by the colonists in their attempts to curb the powers and prerogatives of the royal governor, the principle of the separation of powers was a guiding light for the constitution making that took place after independence had been declared. It was mentioned in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 and in the preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts of 1780, and it thus found official recognition in America years before it was put down in the famous article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The members of the Philadelphia Convention reaffirmed the validity of the Montesquieuian concept, the more so since the preceding years had shown a lapse in its strict observance, which was due largely to the belief that a strong legislature, considered by many as the great liberator from monarchical despotism, could not very well be destructive of the Frenchman's ideal, liberty.

The Federalist accepts the framers' version of the separation of powers. Aware of the probability of legislative usurpations, the authors of that work desire a separation that would be likely to eliminate legislative supremacy. No matter how much Hamilton and Madison might disagree on certain aspects of the separation of powers, they see eye to eye with respect to that major point. Montesquieu's influence on the Papers, however, goes still further. Not only is his idea of a separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches accepted, but also, his concept of checks and balances. Montesqieu seems to have had a special fascination of the authors, especially for Madison. This popularity may have been due partly to Montesquieu's inductive method, which was likely to have a certain appeal to statesmen who were, in a way, suspicious of mere philosophical speculations. However, what probably accounts most for Hamilton's, Madison's, and Jay's sympathy for the Frenchman was the fact that he chose the English constitution as an example of the merits of a separation of powers. Montesquieu thus became the great foreign herald of the rights of Englishmen. These were the rights that our authors believed in, that they hoped would exist in the free government under the Constitution.

Summary:

After Jefferson finished writing "Notes on the State of Virginia," he added a rough draft of a constitution he hoped would be adopted at a state constitutional convention held in 1783. This draft constitution, like everything Jefferson wrote, is original and comprehensive. It is especially pertinent how, because Jefferson draws our attention to the weaknesses, as well as to the strengths, of a republican form of government. One of his proposals, intended to prevent one branch of government from becoming too powerful is unique, but we have some criticism of it. He recommends that a constitutional convention should be held whenever two branches of government, by a two-thirds vote, desire to change the constitution or correct any violation in it.

Since the people are the source of power in a republican form of government, it would seem logical to consult them whenever one branch becomes too powerful or whenever there is a constitutional crisis. But there are problems in depending upon the people to keep each branch within its constitutional limits. In the first place, the people cannot prevent the possibility of two branches combining their strength and power against the third branch. In the second place, frequent appeals to the people suggest a serious defect in government. Such appeals threaten the stability necessary to good government because society is always in a state of turmoil. Although Madison concedes that this country has been successful in revising its form of government, too much experimentation can be dangerous. Because the revolution is behind the country, divergent views and strong disagreements are coming to the surface.

Madison continues that it is evident that the legislative branch is most likely to seize power from the other two branches. The appeals of the people would, therefore, come from either the executive or the judicial branch. But those branches combined are smaller than the legislative branch, and the people are not as familiar with them. The judicial branch, in particular, is far removed from the people because justices are appointed, rather than elected, and serve for life; the people will always view the president with certain skepticism; every administration will be subject to a degree of unpopularity and distortion. By contrast, members of the legislative branch move freely among the people and are connected to them by ties of blood and friendship. The representatives are elected by the people and are the most responsive to their wishes. Furthermore, they are regarded as the chief defenders of the peoples' rights and liberties. For these reasons it is doubtful that the executive and judicial branches could enlist the sympathies of the people. Not only could the legislators plead their cause most successfully, they would dominate the very conventions called to air the grievances against them.

Analysis

In this essay, more than any other besides perhaps 51, Madison lays out his philosophy on free government. Madison does not state in the Federalist how the state of nature is left and government created. We may assume, however, that his opinion does not differ here from what has been called the core of his philosophy, namely the compact theory of the foundation of the state. This theory was generally accepted at the time the essays were written, whereas the organic theory was hardly known. Madison adhered to it even when it was being abandoned by most European theorists, and called it a "fundamental principle of free government." Furthermore, the acceptance of the compact theory in the Federalist can be concluded from the fact that Madison, who recognizes a parallel between the formation of the state by individuals and the formation of a confederacy of state, calls the Confederation "a compact among the States."

Madison's view on the relation between people and government has important consequences. From his conception of government as a means follows not only the primacy of the individual's protection before popular participation in government, but also that his Federalist, advocating the Union, can be a treatise on the Union only in a relative sense and must, in an absolute sense, be a treatise for individual rights. His conception of society as an intrastate phenomenon must influence his view on the nature of confederations and the Union. Finally, from the necessity of the independence of the government from the people follows the possibility that government abuses it power. In that case the people, possessing "the transcendent and precious right . .. . to Œabolish or alter their governments as to them shall most likely to effect their safety and happiness (62)" may resort to a revolution. Furthermore, from the subjection of government under a constitution follows the existence of two sorts of man-made law; that by which the government is bound (society-made, fundamental, constitutional law), and that by which the government binds the people (government-made, ordinary, statue law).

In summary, Madison believed that the individuals, motivated by self-interest, leave the state of nature in order to live under justice in a free government that, primarily, protects their lives, liberty, and property and ­ the degree compatible with the security of these rights ­ permit people to participate in government under a constitution. The main threat to free government arises form its own creation, factions, the control of which is of vital importance. The latter observation has important implications for Madison's inquiry into the compatibility of concrete governments with the ideal free government. In his search for the government that is most likely to realize that ideal, he need only look for a government under which factions are controlled.

Summary:

James Madison begins his famous federalist paper by explaining that the purpose of this essay is to help the readers understand how the structure of the proposed government makes liberty possible. Each branch should be, for the most part, in Madison's opinion, independent. To assure such independence, no one branch should have too much power in selecting members of the other two branches. If this principle were strictly followed, it would mean that the citizens should select the president, the legislators, and the judges. But, the framers recognized certain practical difficulties in making every office elective. In particular, the judicial branch would suffer because the average person is not aware of the qualifications judges should possess. Judges should have great ability, but also be free of political pressures. Since federal judges are appointed for life, their thinking will not be influenced by the president who appoints them, or the senators whose consent the president will seek.

Madison furthers, the members of each branch should not be too dependent on the members of the other two branches in the determination of their salaries. The best security against a gradual concentration of power in any one branch is to provide constitutional safeguards that would make such concentration difficult. The constitutional rights of all must check one man's personal interests and ambitions. We may not like to admit that men abuse power, but the very need for government itself proves they do, "if men were angels, no government would be necessary." Unfortunately, all men are imperfect, the rulers and the ruled. Consequently, the great problem in framing a government is that the government must be able to control the people, but equally important, must be forced to control itself. The dependence of the government on the will of the people is undoubtedly the best control, but experience teaches that other controls are necessary.

Dividing power helps to check its growth in any one direction, but power cannot be divided absolutely equally. In the republican form of government, the legislative branch tends to be the most powerful. That is why the framers divided the Congress into two branches, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and provided for a different method of election in each branch. Further safeguards against legislative tyranny may be necessary.

In a representative democracy it is not only important to guard against the oppression of rulers, it is equally important to guard against the injustice which may be inflicted by certain citizens or groups. Majorities often threaten the rights of minorities. There are only two methods of avoiding evil. The first is to construct a powerful government, a "community will." Such a "will' is larger than, and independent of, the simply majority. This "solution" is dangerous because such a government might throw its power behind a group in society working against the public good. In our country, the authority to govern comes from the entire society ­ the people. In addition, under the Constitution society is divided into many groups of people who hold different views and have different interests. This makes it very difficult for one group to dominate or threaten the minority groups.

Justice is the purpose of government and civil society. If government allows or encourages strong groups to combine together against the weak, liberty will be lost and anarchy will result. And the condition of anarchy tempts even strong individuals and groups to submit to any form of government, no matter how bad, which they hope will protect them as well as the weak.

Madison concludes that self-government flourishes in a large country containing many different groups. Some countries are too large for self-government, but the proposed plan modifies the federal principle enough to make self-government both possible and practical in the Untied States.

Analysis

In this essay, Madison's thoughts on factionalism are delineated clearly. As we observed earlier, he assumed that conflicts of interests are inherent in human nature, and he recognized that, as a consequence, people fall into various groups. He wanted to avoid a situation in which any one group controlled the decisions of a society. Free elections and the majority principle protected the country from dictatorship, that is, the tyranny of a minority. However, he was equally concerned about the danger that he thought was more likely in a democracy, that is, the tyranny of the majority. A central institutional issue for him was how to minimize this risk.

Madison's solution characteristically relied not only on formal institutions, which could be designed, but also on the particular sociological structure of American society, which he took as a fortunate starting point for the framers of the new constitution. The institutional component in his solution was checks and balances, so that there were multiple entry points into the government and multiple ways to offset the power that any one branch of the government might otherwise acquire over another. In this system, "the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on each other."

These institutional arrangements were reinforced by the sociological fact that the Republic contained a multiplicity of interests that could, and did, offset one another: "While all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger form interested combinations of the majority." It is good that there are many group interests; that they be numerous is less important than that they be impermanent and shifting alliances whose components vary with the specific policy issue.

Madison commenced the statement of his theory in Federalist 51 with an acknowledgement that the "have nots" in any society are extremely likely to attack the "haves," for like Hamilton the Virginian believed class struggle to be inseparable from politics. "It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard against the oppression of its rulers," Madison writes, "but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest the rights of the minority will be insecure."

Madison, it is clear, had emancipated himself from the sterile dualistic view of society that was so common in the eighteenth century and that so obsessed Hamilton. Madison was one of the pioneers of "pluralism" in political thought. Where Hamilton saw the corporate spirit of the several states as poisonous to the union, Madison was aware that the preservation of the state governments could serve the cause of both liberty and union. Finally, the vastness of the United States, a fact that Hamilton considered the prime excuse for autocracy was recognized by Madison as the surest preservative of liberty. To assert after reading this passage that Alexander Hamilton wrote Federalist 51 is to imply first, that he was a magician in mimicking Madison's very words and tone of vote, and in the second place that he was the most disingenuous hypocrite that ever wrote on politics. No unprejudiced or informed historian would accept this latter charge against Hamilton.

It is interesting to note that the Federalist papers are unique, as shown in this paper, because of the extreme amount of thought that was put into the design of the constitution, as shown in Madison's original thought process that were penned in 51. Many, if not most, changes in institutional design, they usually occur as the reactions of shortsighted people to what they perceive as more-or-less short-range needs. This is one reason the Constitutional Convention was a remarkable event. The Founding Fathers set out deliberately to design the form of government that would be most likely to bring about the long-range goals that they envisaged for the Republic. What is most unusual about Madison, in contrast to the other delegates, is the degree to which he thought about the principles behind the institutions he preferred. Not only did he practice the art of what nowadays is deemed institutional design, but he developed, as well, the outlines of a theory of institutional design that culminated in this essay.

Summary:

Madison begins this paper explaining that it will examine four points concerning the Senate; the qualification of the senators, the method by which they are selected; equal representation in the Senate; and the number of senators and the six-year term.

Two differences exist between the qualifications of senators and representatives: senators must be older and must be citizens of the United States longer. Senators serve longer and need a broader knowledge of government affairs, particularly in the area of foreign relations; consequently, the framers thought they should be older. Appointment by the state legislatures, rather than election by the people, is desirable for two reasons: first, this type of appointment assures that the Senate will consist of a select group of men, and the appointment by the states will provide a link between the states and the national government.

The Constitution provides for two senators from each state. This equality of representation is clearly a compromise between the different interests of the large and small states. In a federal system (where power is share between the states and the national government), it would be unfair not to recognize two opposing principles ­ proportional versus equal representation. The principle of proportional representation is recognized in the House; the principle of equal representation is recognized in the Senate. Equal representation in the Senate protects the sovereignty of all the states, thus ensuring that the new government will not abolish the state governments. It also means that a bill, which must be passed by both houses before it becomes a law, will reflect the whishes of the people (represented by the House) and the states (represented by the Senate).

The method of appointing the senators solves another important problem. Frequently, men who hold public office forget their obligation to the people, and therefore, betray the public trust. By dividing the legislative branch into two parts and requiring agreement between them, the liberties of the people will be more secure, and the passage of bad laws will be more difficult. The history of governments all over the world demonstrates that where the legislative body is not divided their partisan leaders often sway the legislators. The senate, which consists of fewer men who will hold their office for six years, reduce this threat. Representatives, elected by the people, serve for only two years; in many cases their private occupations may be more important to them than their public office, and they cannot be expect to devote sufficient time to government or to a study of the laws. Most blunders of our governments to date have been caused by incompetence and a lack of political wisdom.

The Senate will not only provide stability in government, it will reduce the tendency of the House to pass too many laws. Unnecessary legislation produces chaos and favors the wealthy. The people cannot be expected to keep up with too many new laws and regulations; farmers and merchants will be reluctant to start new business ventures if they feel that new regulations will hurt their investments.

The object of good government is the happiness of the people, but good intentions are not enough. Our state and national governments have paid too little attention of statecraft and the art of government. Fortunately, the structure of the government under the Constitution will help to correct this defect. A society cannot progress unless the government is stable and respectable.

Analysis

There can be little doubt that the designers of the Constitution saw good public policy and stability in the laws as paramount concerns. In Federalist 62, for example, Madison defended the Senate in the proposed bicameral Congress on the grounds, in part, that the Senate could block passage of undesirable polices which a unicameral legislature might approve: "Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the States." Similarly, "a Senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly distinct from and dividing the power with a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient."

One reason that House members could not always be trusted stemmed from their short terms of office. To Madison, this meant that these legislators would be unable to develop the necessary wisdom about public policy. As he remarked about the virtues of a Senate whose members have longer terms, "Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature continued in appointment for a short time and led by no permanent motive to devote the internals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust." It was thought that a Senate with a slow turnover and whose members had long terms of office would be able to avoid the unwise polices that a unicameral legislature might be expected to produce.

A bicameral legislature could also be expected to help prevent instability in the laws. There was no doubt in Madison's mind that instability in the laws had great costs: "To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume." These effects were both external and internal. Externally, instability causes the nation to forfeit "the respect and confidence of other nations." Internally, the consequences of instability were even worse ­ "it poisons the blessings of liberty itself." Commerce could also expect to suffer from an unstable government.

In 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet published his Essai, in which he explicitly noted and discussed the particular problem of majority rule instability. While The Federalists do not specifically discuss the problems of majority rule instability, one scholar notes that Madison had read Condorcet's essay and is known to have written a review of it, a review which is now, unfortunately, lost. Although not explicitly, therefore, Madison and the Federalist papers do internally deal with instability, especially within Federalist 62 and the instability of the legislature branch.

Summary:

Madison continues this essay where he left off, claming that the fifth desire of the utility of a Senate is the "want of a due sense of national character." To any foreign country, it is necessary to have a strong, perceptive senate to ensure respect and confidence. Other nation's opinions are important for two reasons: first, that a plan will appeal to other countries as a wise policy and second, the opinion of the world, in difficult situations, can be followed. Yet, however important national character is, the Senate cannot be a numerous and changeable body. It must be small enough so that public opinion can guide each of the members, as well as pride in their actions, because of the great amount of public trust in the body.

A sixth defect is the want of responsibility in the government to the people, because of the frequency of elections and other cases. The Senate, however, solves this defect because it is in power long enough to be responsible for the decisions that it makes.

The Senate is not a well-conceived idea, however, merely because it represents the people. It is also a good idea because at times the people need to be protected from their own ideas and prejudices. Although people are spread over an extensive region, they can still be "subject to the infection of violent passions"

In addition, "history informs us of no long lived republic which had not a senate." They, however, had senates elected for life. America, however, will not follow these examples because they are repugnant to the foundations upon which the country is built. The plan of the senate, however, blends the stability with the ideal of liberty. A senate, however, is still extremely important and necessary because they then represent the people but are immune from the people's whims. The people must be represented and in a senate that sits for life, this does not occur.

Some people, however, argue that six years is to long and leads to tyrannical situations. Madison answers, however, that in order for the Senate to corrupt, it must corrupt itself, the state legislatures, the House of Representatives, and the people at large. It, therefore, is not possible in only six years. If the people do not believe Madison, they should look at the examples of the State Constitution, particularly Maryland, which has a strong senate that has not corrupted the rest of the state. The best example, however, is Britain's House of Lords, a hereditary assembly, which has not infected the rest of the country. With the balance of the House of Representative to guard and represent the people, the Senate is a necessary and important function of government that will support the "people themselves."

Analysis

In order to effectively understand James Madison's argument in this federalist paper, it is necessary to understand the constitution's opponent's critique of the senate. Anti-Federalists argued that the Senate was too powerful and aristocratic. Federal farmer argued that, "The formation of the senate, and the smallness of the house, being, therefore, the result of our situation, and the actual state of things, the evils which may attend the exercise of many powers in this national government may be considered as without remedy." Likewise, Centinel lamented that the Senate is "the great efficient body in this plan of government" and that it "is constitution on the most unequal principles." Cincinatus summed up the critique quite well: "We have seen powers, in every branch of government, in violation of all principle and all safety condensed in this aristocratic senate; we have seen the representative or democratic branch, weakened exactly in proportion to the strengthening of the aristocratic."

This Federalist paper defends the Senate as providing the wisdom and the stability ­ "aristocracy virtues" ­ needed to check the fickle lack of wisdom that Madison predicated would characterize the people's branch of the new government, the lower house. Nor were there other critics lacking who, recognizing that the Constitution ultimately rested on popular consent, who, seeing that despite the ingenious apparatus designed to temper the popular will by introducing into the compo