Summary

Book I of The Consolation of Philosophy begins with a poem which explains why the writer has begun this work. He says "I who once composed with eager zest/Am driven by grief to shelter in sad songs." This lament echoes a classical form of Greek poetry (though Boethius is a Latin writer imitating an old Greek style) and gives us information about the poet's situation as well as an introduction to his outlook and purpose for the ensuing dialogue. The lament is a conventional form of grief poetry, and the reference to "song" in the second line is also traditional for beginnings (though more often seen in epic poems than in philosophy, such as The Aeneid, or Homer's Iliad).

The sorrowful writer is visited by a vision of a woman standing over him. A mystical vision, she is "full of years" yet with undiminished color and vigor. She appears to him of varying height, sometimes of normal human dimensions and sometimes scraping the heavens. Boethius carefully notes her robe, which he says consists of an "imperishable material" woven by her own hands. This magical dress, however, is covered with the dust of long neglect. She bears written on her hem the Greek letter Pi, and on the top of her gown the letter Theta. Between these letters is a ladder of steps going from the bottom to the top.

Another feature of the woman's dress is that it has been "torn by the hands of marauders who had each carried off such pieces as he could get." She also carries some books in her right hand, and in her left hand a scepter.

Before the woman arrived, Boethius tells us that standing at his bedside were the muses of Poetry, who dictated to him as he wrote poetry and wept. At the sight of the Muses the woman becomes angry. She calls the muses "hysterical sluts," and tells them that they have no medicine to cure Boethius's sickness, and they will steal his Reason away and make him worse. Boethius is not an ordinary man, she says, for he has been nourished by the philosophies of "Zeno and Plato". She further insults them, and the Muses blush and leave.

The mysterious woman, now alone with Boethius, sits down on his bed and recites a poem to him, articulating his grief, and again lamenting his fall from grace. And the woman now says that the time has come for healing rather than lamentation. She says, Are you not the man who was raised on my learning? Why do you not recognize me? Continuing in the doctoring tone, she says that Boethius' grief is nothing serious - only a bit of amnesia. At this she takes a fold of her dress and wipes the tears from Boethius's eyes. His reaction is detailed in a poem, which says that Boethius's eyes were then cleared.

Boethius looks upon the woman, and realizes that she is Philosophy, his nursemaid of old. She has come to succor him, and make his imprisonment easier. She details that she, like Boethius, has undergone many trials, and in the latter years the various philosophical sects had struggled to "seize for their own the inheritance of wisdom" by trying to carry her off. They only got parts of her robe, and each went away thinking that they had obtained the whole of philosophy. These traces of her clothing had given these Epicureans and Stoics a reputation of wisdom among the ignorant. Again, Philosophy recites a poem, extolling the virtues of men who are not moved by the vagaries of fortune. She asks Boethius why he weeps at this, and tells him to explain to her his "illness" or wound so that she may heal him.

Boethius then details his list of woes. He reminds her that he is in prison, rather than studying her wisdom in the library of his home. He complains that such is the lot of her followers, and that he had gone into politics because Plato had written that any state was best run by "philosopher-kings". He explains how his gravity and honesty made him no friends in the political arena, and incited the jealousy and hatred of powerful enemies. He had campaigned for just laws and fair taxation, and had resisted and tried to uproot corruption. He explains the various charges brought against him, but the crux of the matter is that he was accused of having desired the safety of the Senate. Because of the crooked politics of the day, and because he had prevented an informer from producing evidence of the Senate's treason, he was judged by that same body has having commited a crime. Boethius cries out to Philosophy - Was this justice? He was also accused of unchecked ambition, but he says that he had always followed her recommendation of the Pythagorean maxim "Follow God" in all things. He is angry and saddened that, while he was faithful to Philosophy, his reward is imprisonment and, soon, execution. Boethius then recites a longer poem, extolling God but asking why the world is ruled by fickle Fortune.

Philosophy responds, saying that it is not important that he is no longer in his ornate library. Her teachings are the only things of value, and those are still inside him. She diagnoses him as "swollen and calloused" under the influence of disturbing emotions, and she will begin with a gentle cure, working up to stronger medicine when he has begun to heal. She then questions Boethius to discover precisely the state of his mind. She wants to know if he believes in a directed universe, or if he is convinced of the haphazard nature of fate. Boethius responds that he believes that God the Creator watches over his creation. Continuing the questioning, she discovers that he is confused about how fate and fortune do not control the final, most important destiny of man. Philosophy says that Boethius has forgotten his true nature, and that he is a spiritual being, a soul in communication with God, rather than just a rational animal existing in the material world. Boethius weeps because he is in mortal peril and his possessions and honors have been taken away from him; Philosophy reminds him he still has his most important, and, in fact, his only true possession - his soul. She stops here, however, because the patient is still too ill to take the full "cure" she offers. The Book ends with a poem extolling the virtue of rejecting emotions and ignoring the dictates of fortune.

Analysis

This Book sets up of Boethius' situation and introduces the mysterious personage of Philosophy. Some of Boethius' conventions are specifically Classical in origin, and do not necessarily make sense when read by a reader today unless some historical context is included. It was common for philosophical discussions and arguments of any type be presented in a dialogue format. The apocalyptic nature of this dialogue (meaning that one of the speakers is imaginary, spiritual, legendary, allegorical, or divine) is necessary because of the solitary imprisonment of the writer. He is alone in his cell, and has conversations only with himself. He must imagine a speaker, or be visited by the incarnate spirit of Philosophy, in order to carry on a conversation and thus present his "consolation" of philosophical principles in the Platonic dialogue form.

The varying height of Philosophy is significant; it is symbolic of the various guises of philosophical study. When she is of average height, she offers the practical advice for the down-to-earth pursuit of moral, or ethical, philosophy. When she is piercing the heavens, she is showing her capacity for metaphysical thought, which is considered by Boethius to be speculative or contemplative philosophy. The Pi and Theta on her gown represent the two Greek names for these types of philosophy, which begin with those letters. The division is between the practical and the contemplative forms of philosophy, the practical including moral philosophy and ethics, the contemplative or speculative includes theology, metaphysics, and the natural sciences such as physics. The impermeable fabric of the gown represents the permanence and objective reality of Philosophy in its true form, and the scraps torn by the factions of lesser philosophers a metaphor for Boethius' opinion of those schools of thought.

At the beginning of Part V, there is a line in the poem that reads "swifter hours of the night". Roman timekeeping had much in common with how it is done today, but in their system of reckoning hours, by means of a water clock, there is a significant difference. The Romans changed the length of the nighttime hours to coincide with the shortening and lengthening of days by the seasons. During the winter, the nights were longer, so the same number of hours were used for nighttime as during the summer, but the length of the "hours" were lengthened. The reverse was true for summer, with the nighttime hours being "swifter" and shorter.

Boethius was imprisoned on what he called "false accusations". Politically, Boethius had made no friends, for he was above corruption and graft during one of the most corrupt times of the Roman Empire. He had formerly been a high official for the emperor Theodoric, and his fall from the heights of Roman patrician power to imprisonment was almost as great as any fall for a man of his time could be. For a man of his culture and refinement, the irony of losing everything because of his own virtue, and in an arena, (politics) which he didn't enter willingly but rather chose out of duty, must have been acute. Boethius says in Book I that he mourns the fact that he is no longer in his library, with its ivory decorations, reading his beloved books. So he creates, in his prison cell, under threat of imminent execution, a fantasy of philosophical discourse with the Lady Philosophy herself. It is an academic conceit not unique to Boethius, but is also telling of his state of mind and emotional needs. He needs comfort - consolation - and finds it in carefully constructing in his mind a person representing his most cherished pursuit of Philosophy. To this authority he appeals for comfort and for answers to his questions, and make an attempt to formulate a theodicy, or theory of good and evil.

After reading this first book of The Consolation of Philosophy, perhaps two things strike the modern reader. Why doesn't Boethius, a Christian, appeal to God or Jesus or the Virgin Mary for his consolation in his time of mortal peril, rather than Philosophy? Boethius was a Christian, and people often pray to God when they are in trouble or think they are going to die. Boethius wrote a consolation of Philosophy, not Theology, and we could assume that at least part of his motivation was coldly stylistic rather than personally applicable. Boethius carefully imitated the Platonic dialogues, and to have the Christian God intrude into what was a pagan form would have offended his sensibilities. It is more likely, however, that Boethius, while a Christian, may not have been particularly religious. But even if Boethius was devout, it also bears considering that his culture was still pagan in many ways. He may have had an overlay of Christianity, and truly believed in it, but as a Neo-Platonist and Roman his appeal to reason and philosophy was perhaps closer to his heart. He does, however, refer to a personal God, and reminds us to pray humbly to God at the end of this book.

The second oddity is the inclusion of verse in a philosophical text. Boethius was not exactly writing a dry philosophical treatise - this is a consolation (the Latin literary form consolatio) and meant to be a balm or medicine for a troubled soul. This book, though definitely philosophical in nature, was meant to be a sort of instructional self-help book for the late Roman Empire. Such consolations of philosophical thoughts were written by other writers and widely read.

The divorce from emotions, and the shunning of the honors and cares of the material world are main themes in The Consolation of Philosophy. This Neo-Platonist, and what would become later medieval philosophical idea is central to Boethius's thinking, and what he found most comforting in his prison cell.

Summary

At the beginning of Book II, Lady Philosophy has grown silent. She has become quiet so that Boethius, in his weakened spiritual state, entreats her to speak. She says that she has fully diagnosed the cause and nature of his condition, and will prepare the "persuasive powers of sweet-tongued rhetoric," a power often abused by those who do not properly understand Philosophy, to gently heal him of his illness. Again, she reiterates that Boethius is pining away for his former good fortune, and the loss of which has corrupted his mind. She says that Boethius has been seduced by Fortune (sometimes called Lady Fortune), and that in her many guises she has lured other people to their undoing, too. Again, Philosophy describes the capricious nature of Fortune, pointing out how the workings of Fortune are not to be considered tragic when they cause reversals for her former beneficiaries. Fortune's "gifts" are really loans, Philosophy reminds Boethius, and to return something that was only lent to you is not a loss and not something about which to grieve.

Philosophy also implies that, while Boethius enjoyed Fortune's favors, he must have known that her gifts were not very important anyway. Boethius is reminded not only that he came into this world with none of Fortune's gifts, and he should never have become so attached to any of them that he could not lose them without grief.

While Boethius acknowledges the logic of Philosophy's argument, he is not yet in a fit state to receive comfort from it. Here Philosophy reminds Boethius, somewhat to his pain so she does not dwell on it, that he was in this earthly life the luckiest of men. Though orphaned, he was adopted into the home of a very aristocratic and well-respected man, and he married into that same family. He has been blessed not only with a worthy and modest wife, but also two good sons. And he had the privilege of seeing those sons raised to the office of consul together.

Boethius then complains that the worst part of this is the memory of his past good fortune. "In all adversity of fortune, the most wretched kind is once to have been happy." Philosophy counters that the most precious gift from Fortune, Boethius's family, still exists unharmed. Compared to many, Fortune says, Boethius is still a very fortunate man.

A debate ensues on the way happiness can be attained by a human being, for, it seems, even if a person has all the gifts of fortune, there is still anxiety and disquiet in his or her heart. Philosophy says that human happiness is impossible to achieve in earthly life. Happiness is not found in the temporal gifts of Fortune - not even in those most precious gifts of family. The discussion continues onto the nature of "good" in the things that the world considers "good fortune," which are wealth, material possessions, power, and honor. Each of these things is said by Philosophy to be incapable of bestowing true happiness. Wealth is only of value when being transferred, and such has no value in itself. In addition, any acquisition of wealth is the taking away of wealth from someone else. The power of wealth is not something that is your own, but rather a function of that wealth, so then how can it make you happy? Honor and power can be bestowed upon you by someone who is not a fair judge of either, so these are not the path to happiness either. The beauty of Nature, too, is incapable of giving true happiness because we cannot take credit for Nature. It is entirely the construction of God, and therefore we can only admire it but cannot claim it for our own. If one desires fancy clothing, or a long line of servants, the good of either (the skill of the tailor, or, if they are honest, the honesty of the servants) cannot be truly owned by the possessor, so they are not the path to happiness either. "From all this it is obvious that not one of those things which you count among your blessings is in fact any blessing of yours at all." Philosophy says.

The only things which a person may truly possess are the blessings of his or her own intellectual inquiry and soul. Since these are internal blessings, it is argued, they can never be taken away, and are wholly owned by the thinker. God, Philosophy says, made human beings to rule the Earth, but not to attempt to adorn themselves with inferior things. God has given humankind an intellect by which to inquire into philosophical things, not to concern themselves with goods which can only be inferior to the worth of their own minds. Add to this that the human soul is immortal, and cannot and never will be satisfied by a temporal happiness from earthly things, which would only last until the death of the body.

Boethius counters that he never wanted any of the temporal blessings for his own sake. He is not an ambitious man, but only entered public life out of a sense of duty. But Lady Philosophy reminds Boethius that he did enjoy his honors, and, while they were well-deserved, it is important that everyone remembers that the gifts of Fortune are inconstant and can be easily taken away. After death, the soul will look back on what was so important in life and consider it to be insignificant. In this life, it is probably better for the soul to have bad fortune, for that does not enslave the soul as much as good fortune does.

Philosophy relents slightly from her strict censure of Fortune's gifts near the end of Book II, when she says that bad fortune gives another great gift; the knowledge of one's true friends, the ones who truly love you. This wisdom, she says, could not be bought for any price while one had good fortune. She ends the book with a hymn about how love binds the earth together.

Analysis

The beginning of Book II contains a subtle hint to the reader that Boethius was a spiritual and philosophical man before his honors and possessions were taken away by imprisonment. When Philosophy says that Boethius, in the favors of Fortune, had "nothing much of value" it is clear that Boethius has always had, or at least affected to have, a disdain for worldly things. A man who was born into a patrician family, with a famous name and extraordinary powers of intellect, who never wanted for money, and experienced royal favor and advancement for much of his life may well have had disdain for worldly possessions, honors, and achievements. This passage seems a little naïve unless considered within the context of Christianity. If Boethius were still a pagan Roman, the gifts of the goddess Fortuna would have been things to pray for, and, if received, things for which he would have given praise to the gods. But the teachings of Catholic Christianity were such that none of the gifts of Fortune (health, long life, a loving and healthy family, as well as honors, wealth, and preferment) were to be valued as much as the love of God and spiritual enlightenment. Boethius is espousing a wholly Christian position here, couched in the language of philosophy.

The psychological progression of Boethius here is plain to see. He slowly allows his emotions to quieten, letting himself rest while he turns his thoughts back to the logic of Philosophy's argument. His sorrow is still acute and not assuaged, but he thinks he has possibly found the way to convince himself that his lot is not so bad. Boethius, throughout his life, was very interested in logic, and wrote several books on the subject. He believed wholeheartedly in its powers, and The Consolation of Philosophy can be viewed as a logical justification for much of Christian doctrine.

The enshrinement of Symmachus, Boethius's father-in-law, and Boethius's wife, Rusticiana, as paragons of moral purity seem to give comfort to Boethius. Again, it is argued, however, that true happiness cannot be found in the temporal gifts of Fortune, not even in the love of one's family. While this idea is not necessarily one that would be agreed upon by modern psychology, it is essential to Christian belief. It is also indicative of the times in which Boethius lived. Not only could family (especially young children) be taken off quickly by disease or accident, but the uncertain political climate of Rome governed by the barbarian emperors also meant that the lives of one's family and friends were by no means assured. Placing total faith in and hanging one's happiness on one's loved ones was an easy way, Philosophy argues, to become quickly unhappy.

The middle and end of Book II is one of Boethius's most powerful passages. He begins with his complaint that to have been happy and then be disgraced is more sorrowful than having never been happy. Boethius, though perhaps feeling this emotion sharply in his miserable imprisonment, surely knows the fallacy of this argument before he begins it. Philosophy sharply reminds him that one of the most precious gifts of Fortune, his family, is still intact, and therefore he should be happier than many men. Philosophy explains that he has lost nothing that he ever truly had, and she then enlightens Boethius on the "good" in earthly good things that was never truly good, because it was never truly possessed. Philosophy argues that even pleasures that seem obvious, such as the pleasure of having many servants to do our hard work, are not necessarily "good" - after all, when our servants do wrong we are responsible, but when they do right we cannot claim credit. This points to Philosophy's essential argument: a person cannot claim credit for the "good" he or she experiences in earthly life. This "good" depends on Fortune and not on human effort. Only attainment of philosophical wisdom in the mind can truly be called one's own.

This argument may or may not convince many readers, but it is sound in many respects. It explains, especially in regard to wealth, the momentary satisfaction but enduring emptiness many people feel upon attaining certain goals of wealth or material possessions. Near the end of Book II Philosophy explains that most people mistake the "good" of inferior things (material possessions, power over other people, honors given by other people) for the true good: the good eternal things of the soul. It is a standard religious tenet of more than one faith, but the way Boethius couches it in terms of ownership is compelling.

He particularly shines in his explanation of how most people attempt to adorn themselves with exterior, inferior "goods" (whether those be clothing, servants, or power and honor) while they neglect the greatest and only real good that they possess: their minds made in the image of their Creator. When human beings recognize their own nature as being Godlike, rather than earthly, that is when they "tower above the rest of creation." All other goods, separate from the mind and the soul, are merely "decoration" that denigrates what it is decorating, because it does not belong to it. Some readers may find the argument about ownership to be too callous, and perhaps the rejection of Nature as a source of happiness is skewed, but the overall construction of the chapter is a convincing argument for spirituality.

Some of this argument is based on Neo-Platonist principles of substance and belonging, which don't directly affect the argument but inform some of Boethius' language. Boethius tosses out phrases such as "If every good is agreed to be more valuable than whatever it belongs to" as if the reader, schooled in philosophy, would not dispute these statements or require explanation. Nevertheless, Book II is intense, convincing, and contains eight beautiful poems which explicate the text.

Summary

Book III, the central Book and the longest of the five, opens with Boethius enchanted by Philosophy's final song of Book II. Throughout The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius tells us, Philosophy's songs have been accompanied by the most beautiful music, for music is Philosophy's "handmaid"

Boethius has become refreshed, and the compelling arguments of Book II have made him ready for more "cures" and "capable of facing the blows of Fortune." Philosophy then informs Boethius that the object of her next lecture will be true happiness. True and perfect happiness can only be achieved by the possession of the supreme good in which all goods are possessed. All human beings desire true happiness, but most are lead into error by desiring false, or temporal, goods.

Philosophy goes on to explain that what many in the world think of as good; freedom from want (wealth), respect (honor), power, or fame, or simply pleasure, or those with confused or combined desires, such as the desire for wealth for the sake of power and pleasure, or power for the sake of money and fame, and even those who desire a spouse and children for the pleasure they bring. Beauty and strength of the body confer power and renown, and is a form of those desires. All of these desires are for happiness, however. The problem arises when humanity treats these goods as the ultimate good or the path to happiness. The fallen state (original sin from the Garden of Eden) of man is such that he seeks happiness in these inferior, exterior, multiple goods, rather than the one supreme good of God.

Before, however, Boethius and Philosophy sing their closing hymn to God, the source of all happiness, Philosophy goes through each of the supposed goods of earth. Wealth, once attained, is a source of worry. Physical beauty and strength is an illusion, created by the other people's desire to see beauty in the body. Furthermore, physical beauty and strength are easily and quickly lost, by time and illness. A man in high office receives honor and respect, but the office does not confer wisdom or virtue on the holder. Often, Philosophy says, high office creates corruption and degrades rather than elevates the officeholder. Virtue has intrinsic value, which, once achieved, confers its worth to those who possess it, but the same is not true of high office. If a king or official has power, the constant acquisition of more power would bring more happiness. But there is no empire on earth which rules all of humanity, so the inherent lack of power in power itself confers unhappiness on those with power.

Philosophy begins Part VI of Book III with the admonition, "Fame, in fact, is a shameful thing, and so often deceptive." She argues that nothing is more shameful than unjust fame. Also, the fame of a human being can never be spread to all the people of the world, just as power can't be over all people. Nobility of family doesn't confer virtue, either, except in the negative sense it may incite the noble to not disgrace the memory of their ancestors.

Bodily pleasure is of the least concern to Philosophy. She views it with contempt, and says that its "pursuit is full of anxiety and its fulfillment full of remorse." It is unhealthful, and even the worthy pleasure of a spouse and children can also bring many woes. Because these goods are not perfect, they are unable to give perfect happiness to any human being.

Boethius and Lady Philosophy agree that any or all of these earthly goods cannot bring any measure of true happiness to anyone, and therefore continue their inquiry after the "sufficiency" which would satisfy humanity's desire for true happiness. Here begins Boethius's partial proof for the existence of God. Since Boethius and Philosophy agree that humanity desires true happiness, that standard means that a supreme good exists. Since Lady Philosophy has shown that none of the earthly goods are the supreme good, nor are all of them together the supreme good, something outside of the earth must be the supreme good.

Sufficiency is linked by Lady Philosophy to power, since the being who was sufficient in all things (no longer desiring anything) would be powerful enough to live apart from earthly concerns. Therefore, something that is sufficient would need nothing, want nothing, exhibit supreme powerful, and thus would be worthy of reverence. This being would be happy. Therefore, Lady Philosophy concludes, this being would be wholly sufficient, powerful, glorious, and would be revered.

All of these conditions for pure happiness go by various names, but they consist of the same substance. This one happy, sufficient being, Boethius implies, is God. The unity that God fulfills is the essence of the desire of all things. Boethius and Philosophy end Book III with a song asking for help in finding the true nature of happiness and God.

Analysis

The "lack of completeness" argument for fame and power may seem flimsy to some modern readers. Where is the gratitude for what one has? Why, according to Boethius and Lady Philosophy, can't we be happy with some power and some fame, or, by extension some physical beauty or strength, or some wealth, even though we may not possess all of these things or for eternity or in their completeness. Why is not a measure of good things enough?

Boethius would argue that the incompleteness of these goods shows how imperfect as "goods" they really are. The attainment of any of these desires is merely a misdirected desire for true happiness in God, which is attainable in its complete and whole form. There are some holes in this argument, but, again, it is necessary to consider Boethius's dialogue within the context of his Christianity.

Why, for example, couldn't the attainment of some of the goods (some fame, some money, some physical strength) be a source of lasting or real happiness on earth, at least until death and the communion with God? Boethius sees that no human being is without further desires, and any acquisition of these earthly goods only incites people to want more of them. While some people may be "content" with the satisfaction of their basic needs, they are not made happy by the attainment of these earthly goods, but only by some spiritual source of happiness. So even those who are not particularly greedy or acquisitive are still not able to access happiness here on earth.

To some this may seem a pessimistic argument, and particularly damning of human nature. However, Boethius also considered that any happiness on earth would represent a denial of God, an idea he was unwilling to contemplate because he was a Christian - the suggestion that human beings can be fulfilled and happy apart from God is tantamount to blasphemy for Boethius.

The proof of God in this Book is considered partial by most theologians, and wasn't the focus of the book. Boethius takes for granted that there is a God, and that his readers agree with him. But the proof is based on the inadequacy of temporal desires, and is really a negative proof; because it is not earthly, it must be spiritual. It is carefully constructed, however, and beautifully executed. And, certainly, just because it is negative doesn't mean it is necessarily wrong. Certain aspects of the arguments about physical beauty and bodily pleasure would be refuted by many readers, and, since Boethius doesn't consider them to be all that important, are not as carefully addressed as the desires for fame or power. His overall argument, however, is carefully balanced on the inadequacy of earthly desires and attainments, and its structure is sound.

The leap from the desire for true happiness to the existence of God is not as abrupt as it sounds. It is carefully built up throughout Book III, and lays carefully on the refutation of each kind of happiness possible, according to Boethius, on earth. An atheist, animist, or other spiritual type of happiness is not discussed here - the existence of God is not really in question, it is rather the logical conclusion between two speakers who already agree that God exists. The focus is on the logical argument about the folly of earthly desires.

Summary

Book IV examines the problem of evil's existence. Boethius has listened to and agreed with all of the arguments Philosophy has so far presented. But if God is perfect in his goodness, and is the unity of all things rules the world, how is it that evil is allowed to exist and is not always punished? In addition, where wickedness flourishes, virtue is often downtrodden and even stamped out. If God is omniscient and omnipotent and beneficent how can this evil continue in His world?

Lady Philosophy reminds Boethius of his catechism - that God has said no evil will go unpunished, no virtue will be forgotten. Philosophy also asserts that the wicked are weak and have no power, and the virtuous are strong and powerful.

All people strive to true happiness; the wicked cannot possibly attain it, and the virtuous can attain it. The evil people of the world seek happiness in misguided ways, and they will never attain their goal. Evil people are excluded from attaining the supreme good of perfect happiness, and therefore they are excluded from all that really exists. Since they cannot possibly attain the only thing of value (true happiness) any earthly power they have (which is, as explained in Book II, only ever power over possessions and bodies of people, not their minds or souls) is not actually power at all. Evil people, Philosophy says, cease to exist. The wicked lose power and strength by striving for things that do not matter. They also lose their humanity, and become like the animals they represent by their various desires (the glutton becomes pig-like, the lazy are asses).

Boethius agrees, but he laments that the wicked harm the virtuous and are not punished. Wickedness, like virtue, Philosophy assures Boethius, is its own reward. The wicked, by the fact of their very wickedness, are rewarded by their lack of existence and their descent into bestiality. The are, by their own actions rather than by any outside punishment, denied happiness. If they are punished, the evil people of the world are given a good, for they have a chance at redeeming themselves and changing their ways. When the evil people of the world escape punishment, their capacity and likelihood for more wickedness increases.

Boethius finds this difficult, and protests. He can't abide that the good must suffer the earthly punishments that the evil, who deserve them, inflict upon them. This is acceptable in a world where nothing is determinate, but our world, he says, is ruled by God. How can God in his omnipotence allow this?

The following argument for the foreknowledge (or Providence) of God is famous and somewhat difficult. Philosophy agrees that this is indeed a mystery, and no human being can hope to understand it fully.

All events on Earth are happening in the unchanging mind of God, for whom there is no past, present or future. Since we are temporal beings, we cannot understand how everything that has ever happened or will happen is happening for God simultaneously, but every occurrence is contained within His mind. The government of all changeable things is called Providence. When this is applied in the temporal realm, it is called by the old pagan name of Fate. In short, Providence represents the foreknowledge of God of all things, and controls of the nature of all things. The actual connection of events which occur on Earth is Fate. Providence is the divine reason by which the world is ordered. Fate is the same reason when applied the temporal world. Because we on earth cannot understand Providence, Fate sometimes seems unordered and cruel.

Because of this, anything that happens to you, good fortune or bad, is good, because if your fortune is bad it is an instruction toward virtue. This is, in short, the best of all possible worlds, for evil doesn't actually have any substance or power, and all the events of the world have been planned by Providence.

Analysis

This discussion of evil in the world - this theodicy - is one of the most famous and important passages of this book. The argument that evil has no substance and does not exist is not always considered an orthodox Catholic idea, but it breaks no rules of the catechism and is easier to prove logically than the existence of the devil. The fact that the omniscience, omnipotence, and beneficence of God is retained is the important point here, and Boethius does it with verve and daring.

Some critics have read the seed of fascism in the idea that the truly wicked are no longer human but have become animals. Some fascist states, such as Nazi Germany, similarly contended that the "wicked" are not really human. In Boethius' defense, Lady Philosophy advises compassion toward the wicked, rather than contempt, an idea that is never part of fascist philosophy. However, Philosophy does continue by saying that we should punish the wicked as a cure for their wickedness. Boethius never really examines the human social context that is an inevitable part of determining who is "wicked" and who isn't. If human beings, who are inevitably flawed and cannot understand the true nature of good and evil, take it upon themselves to punish the "wicked" among them, surely injustice may result. Critics have also said that it is possible that Boethius' injunction to purge the wicked justified torture and death for heretics, in order to enable them to "lay aside the filth of vice through the pains of punishment." Again, Boethius does not directly address the difficulty of locating absolute values like "vice" and "virtue" among inevitably flawed, imperfect human beings. Certainly Boethius foreshadows the extremes of the Inquisition and the mass slaughter of Jews and other "heretics" at the hands of Christians.

Boethius' argument that evil does not have any substance is not his own idea. Various philosophies and religions, including Neo-Platonism, had argued this idea before. The way Philosophy explains it through the ineffectual actions of evil people follows from previous arguments she has presented to Boethius. Rather than starting with a cosmic idea of good and evil and the nature of God, she starts, as she has every argument so far, with practical discussions of what is done by human beings on earth. This is, after all, supposed to be a "consolation," not necessarily a cosmography. When Boethius to be able to start with something he knows - the actions of the virtuous and the evil here on earth - he is better able to find comfort in his situation. Perhaps this is the reason Boethius wrote this book to begin with - to explain to himself and others how he was able to, without resorting to the revealed knowledge of the Bible, reconcile himself to his fate.

Providence and Fate are perhaps the two most difficult concepts to understand in this book. Because so much of what Boethius says inspired by faith, the arguments for these concepts may seem flip or inadequate. The concept of God holding all events in his mind at one time, outside of the temporal world, and Fate being the ordering of events in the temporal world, is, in the understatement of Philosophy, a "mystery." This is as complete an explanation of it as can be found, however, outside of a theological text.

Accepting that all fortune is good, and that this is the best of all possible worlds, is as difficult for Boethius as it is for the rest of us. Perhaps few today would accept that bad fortune leads us toward virtue and good fortune leads us to vice. However, this argument comforts Boethius, and makes him more accepting of his fate. Indeed, the Consolation of Philosophy in general functions more as a guidebook for salvaging happiness in the most adverse conditions rather than a theological proof of God's existence or the necessity of evil. One might go so far as to say that Boethius' Lady Philosophy insists upon the existence of God simply because that belief is conducive to Boethius' consolation. Truth and pristine logic are not Boethius' object; resignation in the face of unjust realities is.

Summary

Now Boethius has decided that Philosophy's arguments must be true, but he still questions, "What are we to make of chance?" Chance, or random occurrence without any sequence of causes, cannot exist in the mind of God as Philosophy has described it. "If God imposes order on things," Boethius says to Philosophy, "then there is no opportunity for random events."

Philosophy answers that any chance event that occurs had its own set of hidden causes, whether or not they are perceived by human beings. Whether or not these causes appear to have relation to each other, they are nevertheless governed by Providence.

Boethius then asks how can there be free will in this close-knit chain of events. To this Philosophy asserts that there must indeed be free will, because no rational nature could exist without it. Judgment and the ability to choose are inherent in a rational nature. The more rational a person is, and the more they choose virtue and the pursuit of true happiness in God, the freer that person is. If a person is wicked or enslaved to vice, that person becomes progressively less and less free, and controlled by vice and error.

Here Philosophy returns to the subject of the mind of God, and his one act of knowing everything that has occurred, past and present. Just because God knows what a person with free will is going to choose, doesn't mean that he directed it. God knows all things before they happen, but he doesn't interfere with the free will of human beings.

Boethius protests, saying that these two things are oppositional. How can God know about something before it happens, but therefore not control or direct the free choices of human beings?

Philosophy enters into another long explanation of the mind of God. God does not "know" the world in the same way that human beings do. God is outside of time, so he doesn't view the world in a progression of events. For God no future event is uncertain, no past event forgotten. God knows the world in one single act, which includes knowledge of all the choices of all human beings from the beginning of the world to the end. Therefore he doesn't influence these choices, but he knew of them as part of the whole foreknowledge of the world perceived in one single instance.

This raises the problem of the efficacy of prayer, but Philosophy counsels that prayer is the one way of communicating with God. Even if the future is already ordained (actually not ordained, since, to God, it has already happened) we still must strive to join ourselves with our Creator through prayer. We are temporal creatures, and we can only understand things in a temporal way. This doesn't mean we can't participate in eternity by striving to be one with God.

Philosophy says that it is still important to strive for virtue, for God is always watching and judging. That the world has already happened for God is a mystery to us, but we are temporal and cannot hope to fully understand eternity.

Analysis

This last book of The Consolation of Philosophy raises the most questions of any of the books of The Consolation of Philosophy. The idea of foreknowledge and Providence have been debated for centuries. This argument was even referred to in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. There is no reason to believe that this debate will cease anytime soon.

What is at issue is a central philosophical question of whether or not the world is predetermined or subject to chance. Philosophy walks a middle ground here, saying that God knows all things since he perceives the world in one instance of knowing, but in that instance of knowing he didn't force the choices of all the people in the world. He just knows how it happened, all at once.

Since there is no logical way to support this argument, the idea of the single instant of knowing must be taken as given. Boethius has set up the arguments in the previous books so that this is the only possible solution. He gives credit to Aristotle for this idea, but the preceding arguments and proofs are all his own. Providence is the ordering of all things by God, and he had a plan for his world, but he didn't necessarily influence the choices of the people in it. Fate is simply the events that must occur because, for God, the whole world including all future people and events has already happened. Philosophy is right to call it a mystery.

Free will is very important in this Book because it is a necessary component of Catholic faith. If there were no free will there would be no accountability for sin on earth, and sin is held accountable and confession, and possibly punishment, are necessary for redemption. Boethius had to reconcile the idea of free will to the idea of Providence in order to remain orthodox.

The passages about the wicked being less free than the virtuous are also a part of the free will argument. If the wicked have free will, then can their choices could be considered as valid as the choices the virtuous make? Not so, says Philosophy, for their choices come to be controlled by their vices, not by their sound judgment. The more evil a human being becomes, the less free and less human he or she becomes.

The subject of prayer comes up at the end of this book. If God knows all things, then what is the use of praying to him? Philosophy admonishes Boethius that he should not cut off the one communication conduit he has with God. Prayer is a path to virtue, and the book ends with Philosophy advising Boethius to cultivate virtue as much as possible since God sees and is the judge of all things.

The difficulties with this ordering of the world are plain to a modern reader. For example, even if God does know everything that happens on earth in one instant, he, in his omniscience, can still intervene and could guide the evil towards good if he chose. This would destroy free will, but would it also take away from the idea that God is also all good? If he could prevent someone from turning down the path of evil, why doesn't he?

Free will must be retained, in order to make human beings accountable for their actions and not merely puppets of God. Also, the lack of substance of evil (evil doesn't really exist, it's just a lack of good and has no real power except over unimportant things like the body and possessions) means that God isn't allowing evil to happen, because evil doesn't really exist.

Much depends on faith in these five Books of Boethius, but many logical arguments are contained in it, too. Boethius seems to strain for orthodoxy at times, but that doesn't make the philosophy any less brilliant, or the "consolation" any less real. Again, a modern reader must never forget the context of Boethius' work: he is in a desperate position, striving for a dollop of happiness amidst misery. If his work contains logical fallacies and shortcomings, so be it - the object is consolation, and that object, it seems, is achieved.

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